
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JAMES BEATTIE, LL.D.

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ELEMENTS

OF

MORAL SCIENCE.

BY JAMES BEATTIE, LL. D.

Professor of Moral Philosophy and Logick in the Marischal College and University of Aberdeen.

GRADUATE THEOLOGICAL UNION LIBRARY 1962

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

PHILADELPHIA:

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THESE volumes contain an abridgment, and for the most part a very brief one, of a series of discourses, delivered in Marischal college, on Moral Philosophy and Logick.

It has long been the author's practice, with a view to assist the memory of his hearers, to make them write notes of each discourse. But as that was necessarily done in haste, inaccuracy was unavoidable: and many of them have expressed their wishes that he would put it in their power to procure correct copies of the whole summary, a little enlarged in the doctrinal parts, and with

the addition of a few illustrative examples. This is one of his motives to the present publication; which some are pleased to think has been too long delayed: and which has become the more excusable, as hundreds of manuscript copies of the notes, many of them incomplete as well as incorrect, are now extant; and as several extracts from them have got, he knows not how, into print, with more imperfections, it may be, than could reasonably be imputed to the author. He begs leave to add, as another reason for making these papers publick, that he has been advised to it by many persons, whose judgment and love of good learning entitle them at all times to his most respectful attention.

It will no doubt be observed, that some of the following topicks, though brevity has been aimed at in all, are treated more

compendiously than others. This could, he thinks, be accounted for; but not without much egotism, and a detail of particulars neither necessary nor interesting.

No body, he presumes, will be offended, if in these papers there be found, as there certainly will, numberless thoughts and arguments which may be found elsewhere. It will be considered, that, as a professor's province is generally assigned him by public authority, his business is rather to collect and arrange his materials, than to invent or make them. In his *illustrations*, in order to render what he teaches as perspicuous and entertaining as possible, he may give ample scope to his inventive powers: but, in preparing a *summary* of his principles, he will be more solicitous to make a collection of useful truths, however old, than to

amuse his readers with paradox, and theories of his own contrivance. And let it be considered further, that, as all the practical, and most of the speculative, parts of Moral Science, have been frequently and fully explained by the ablest writers, he would, if he should affect novelty in these matters, neither do justice to his subject, nor easily clear himself from the charge of ostentation.

Of such of the author's Lectures as have already, under the name of *Essays*, been published in the same form in which they were at first composed, particularly those on Language, Memory, and Imagination, he has made this abridgment as brief as was consistent with any degree of perspicuity. Some may think, that he ought to have left out those parts; and he once thought so himself. But it occurred to him, that many persons, into whose

hands this book would perhaps come, may have never seen those printed lectures, and possibly never would see them; that he could not with a good grace recommend it to any body to purchase the volumes in which they are to be found; and that, if those parts should be wholly omitted, his system, as exhibited in this Epitome, would have a mutilated appearance, and be still more imperfect than it is.



CONTENTS.

Page

Introduction. xv

PART I.

PSYCHOLOGY. 1

CHAPTER I.

Perceptive Faculties. 3

SECTION I.

Some Words explained. 4

SECTION II.

The Faculty of Speech. 11

SECTION III.

Essentials of Language. 29

SECTION IV.

Perception, or External Sensation. 58

SECTION V.

Consciousness, or Reflection. 70

SECTION VI.

Memory. 73

SECTION VII.

Imagination. 84

SECTION VIII.

Dreaming. 97

SECTION IX.

Some Secondary Sensations. 102

SECTION X.

Sympathy. 139

SECTION XI.

Taste. 147

CHAPTER II.

Active Powers,

SECTION I.

Free Agency. 159

SECTION II.

Remarks on the Will. 175

SECTION III.

Principles of Action. 179

SECTION IV.

Subject continued. Passions and Affections. 192

SECTION V.

Subject continued. 208

SECTION VI.

Subject continued. 279

SECTION VII.

Of the Passions as they display themselves in the Look and Gesture. 288

INTRODUCTION.

1. HUMAN knowledge has been divided into history, philosophy, mathematicks, and poetry or fable.* History records the actions of men, and the other appearances of the visible universe. Poetry or fable is an imitation of history, according to probability, and exhibits things, not as they are, but as we might suppose them to be. Philosophy investigates the laws of nature, with a view to the regulation of human conduct, and the enlargement of human power. The mathematical sciences ascertain relations and proportions in quantity and number.—History and philosophy are founded in the knowledge of real things. Mathematical truths result from the nature of the quantities or numbers compared together. Poetical representations are approved of, if they resemble real things, and are themselves agreeable.

* Bacon considers poetry as a part of human knowledge, and mathematicks as an appendage to natural philosophy.

2. These parts of knowledge are not always kept distinct or separate. Philosophical investigation may find a place in history, and historical narrative is often necessary in philosophy. Many things in natural philosophy are ascertained and illustrated by mathematical reasoning. Poetical description may contribute to the embellishment of history; as may be seen in many passages of Livy, Tacitus, and other great historians. And true narrative and sound reasoning may in poetry be both ornamental and useful, as we see in many parts of *Paradise Lost*.

3. History is referred to memory, because it records what is past, whereof without memory men would have no knowledge. Poetry is the work of fancy or imagination, that is, of the inventive powers of man; which however must be regulated by the knowledge of nature. Philosophy and mathematicks are improved and prosecuted by a right use of reason: but there is this difference between them, that to the discovery of mathematical truth reason is alone sufficient; whereas, to form a philosopher, reason and knowledge of nature are both necessary. Mathematicks, therefore, though an instrument of philosophy, and an appendage to it, cannot with propriety be called a part of it.

4. Of philosophy, different definitions and descriptions have been given, according to the different views which have been taken of it. As improved by Bacon, Boyle, Newton, and other great men, it may now be defined, the knowledge of nature applied to practical and useful purposes. It is useful in these four respects: first, because it exercises, and consequently improves, the rational powers of man: secondly, because it gives pleasure by gratifying curiosity: thirdly, because it regulates the opinions of men, and directs their actions: and, fourthly, because it enables us to discover in part the existence and attributes of the Supreme Being, the Creator of all things, who has established those general principles, which are called the laws of nature, and according to which all the phenomena of the universe are produced.

5. Without some acquaintance with nature, we could not act at all, either in pursuing good, or in avoiding evil; we should not know that fire would burn or food nourish us. In brutes, whose experience, compared with ours, is very limited, the want of this knowledge is supplied, as far as may be necessary for them or beneficial to us, by natural instinct.—We discover causes by comparing things together, and observing the relations, resemblances, and connections, that

take place among them, and the effects produced by their being applied to one another. And, by comparing several causes together, we may sometimes trace them up to one common cause, or general principle; as Newton resolved the laws of motion into the *vis inertiæ* of matter.

6. As all philosophy is founded in the knowledge of nature, that is, of the things that really exist; and as all the things that really exist, as far as we are concerned in them and are capable of observing them, are either bodies or spirits, philosophy consists of two parts, the Philosophy of Body, and the Philosophy of Spirit or Mind. The latter, which is our present business, has been sometimes called the Abstract Philosophy, because it treats of things abstracted or distinguished from matter; and sometimes it is called Moral Philosophy, on account of its influence on life and manners. It consists, like every other branch of science, of a speculative and a practical part: the former being employed in ascertaining the appearances, and tracing out the laws of nature; the latter, in applying this knowledge to practical and useful purposes. But to keep these two parts always, and entirely distinct, would, if at all practicable, occasion no little inconvenience.

7. The speculative part of the philosophy of mind has been called Pneumatology. It inquires into the nature of those spirits or minds, whereof we may have certain knowledge, and wherewith it concerns us to be acquainted; and those are the Deity and the human mind. Of other spirits, as good and evil angels, and the vital principle of brutes, (if this may be called spirit), though we know that such things exist, we have not from the light of nature any certain knowledge, nor is it necessary that we should. Pneumatology, therefore, consists of two parts, first, Natural Theology, which evinces the being and attributes of the Deity, as far as these are discoverable by a right use of reason; and, secondly, the Philosophy of the Human Mind, which some writers have termed Psychology. We begin with the latter, because it is more immediately the object of our experience. An Appendix will be subjoined, concerning the immortality and incorporeal nature of the human soul.

8. The mind of man may be improved, in respect, first, of action, and secondly, of knowledge. The practical part, therefore, of this abstract philosophy consists of two parts, Moral Philosophy (strictly so called), which treats of the improvement of our active or moral powers; and Logick, which treats of the improvement of

our intellectual faculties. Thus we see that the moral sciences may be reduced to four, PSYCHOLOGY, NATURAL THEOLOGY, MORAL PHILOSOPHY, and LOGICK. These, with their several divisions and subdivisions, I shall consider in that order which may be found the most convenient.

ELEMENTS

OF

MORAL SCIENCE.

PART FIRST.

PSYCHOLOGY.

9. THIS science explains the nature of the several powers or faculties of the human mind. By the *faculties* of the mind, I understand those capacities which it has of exerting itself in perceiving, thinking, remembering, imagining, &c.; and by the *mind* itself, or *soul*, or *spirit*,* of man, I mean that part of the human constitution which is capable of perceiving, thinking, and beginning motion, and without which our body would be a senseless, motionless, and lifeless thing. These faculties were long ago divided into those of PER-

* These words are not strictly synonymous; but it is needless to be more explicit in this place.

CEPTION and those of VOLITION; and the division, though not accurate, may be adopted here. By the perceptive powers we are supposed to acquire knowledge; and by the powers of volition, or will, we are said to exert ourselves in action.

CHAPTER I.

The Perceptive Faculties.

10. THESE may perhaps be reduced to nine. 1. External sensation, by which we acquire the knowledge of bodies and their qualities. 2. Consciousness, by which we attend to the thoughts of our minds, and which is also called reflection. 3. Memory. 4. Imagination. 5. Dreaming. 6. The faculty of speech, whereby we discover what is passing in the minds of one another. 7. Abstraction, a thing to be explained by and by. 8. Reason, judgment, or understanding, by which we perceive the difference between truth and falsehood. 9. Conscience, or the moral faculty, whereby we distinguish between virtue and vice, between what ought to be done and what ought not to be done.

11. Whether this distribution of our perceptive powers be accurate, or sufficiently comprehensive, will perhaps appear afterwards; at present we need not stop to inquire. I shall consider them, not in the order in which I have just now named them, but in that order that shall seem

the most convenient. And I begin with the faculty of speech: that subject being connected with some others that my hearers are already acquainted with, and therefore likely to be attended with little difficulty, even to those who are not much accustomed to abstract inquiry; to which it will, for that reason, serve as a proper and easy introduction. But, before I proceed to it, a few remarks must be premised for the purpose of explaining some words which will frequently occur in the course of these inquiries.

SECTION I.

Some Words explained.

12. That we exist, and are continually employed about a variety of things, is certain and selfevident. Sometimes we perceive things themselves; and this happens when they are so far present with us as to affect our organs or powers of sensation: thus we just now perceive light, and the other things around us. Sometimes we think of things when they are not in this sense present with us. Thus at midnight, or when our eyes are shut, we can think of light, and the other things we have seen or heard during the day.

When we thus think of that which we do not *perceive*, that is, which does not affect our powers of sensation or perception, we are said, in the language of modern philosophy, to have an *idea* or a *notion* of it. *Habere notionem rei alicujus*, is a Latin phrase of like import.

13. The word *idea* has been applied to many purposes; and, from the inaccurate manner in which some writers have used it, has proved the occasion of many errours. It has been used to denote *opinion*, as when we speak of the *ideas* of Aristotle, meaning his opinions or doctrines: but this sense of the word is rather French than English. Sometimes it means one's particular way of conceiving or comprehending a thing; as when we say, the Epicurean philosophy, according to Cicero's *idea* of it, was very unfriendly to virtue. It was long used to signify an imaginary thing, by the intervention of which we were supposed to perceive external things, or bodies. For many ancient and modern philosophers fancied, that the soul could perceive nothing but what was contiguous to it, or in the same place with it; and, as the bodies we perceive *without* us are not in the same place with the soul, (for, if they were, they would all be *within* the human body) it was said that we did not perceive those bodies themselves, but only *ideas* or unsubstantial images of

them, which proceeded from them, and, penetrating the human body, might be in the same place with the soul or contiguous to it. All this is not only fiction, but unintelligible. We perceive *bodies themselves;* and can as easily understand how the soul should perceive what is distant, as how it should perceive what is contiguous or near.

14. In the Platonick, and perhaps too in the Pythagorean philosophy, *ideas* are those external, selfexistent, and uncreated models, prototypes, or patterns, according to which the Deity made all things of an eternal and uncreated matter; and which, while he employs himself in creation, he continually *looks upon:* whence it is supposed that the word ἰδεα (from εἰδειν, to see or behold) is derived. Cicero gives two Latin terms corresponding to *idea*, in this sense of the word; and those are *species* and *forma*. The first (derived from the old Latin verb *specio*, I behold) is more according to analogy; but is inconvenient, because those oblique cases in the plural *specierum* and *speciebus* cannot be admitted into good Latin; and therefore our author prefers the other word *forma*, to whose plural cases there can be no objection. Of these selfexistent ideas Plato was, as Cicero says, marvellously fond; supposing that there was something divine in their nature. The word *idea*, in

this sense of it, we shall not often have occasion to repeat.

15. The same word has still another meaning among philosophers; having been used to denote a thought of the mind, which may be expressed by a general term, or common appellative, that is, by a noun which is not a proper name. The words *man*, *horse*, *mountain*, &c. are significant of *ideas* in this sense of the term, and are general names or common appellatives, because they belong equally to every man, every horse, every mountain. That this may be the better understood, and in order to prepare my hearers for some things that will immediately follow, it is proper to introduce here a few remarks on that faculty of our nature, which some have called abstraction, or the power of forming general ideas by arranging things in classes; a faculty, which the brutes probably have not, and without which both language and science would be impossible.

16. All the things in nature are *individual* things; that is, every thing is itself and one, and not another or more than one. But when a number of individual things are observed to resemble each other in one or more particulars of importance we refer them to a class, tribe, or *species*, to which we give a name; and this name belongs equally to every thing comprehended in

the species. Thus, all animals of a certain form resemble each other in having four feet; and therefore we consider them as in this respect of the same species, to which we give the name *quadruped;* and this name belongs equally to every individual of the species; from the elephant, one of the greatest, to the mouse, one of the least.

17. Again, observing several species to resemble each other in one or more particulars of importance, we refer them to a higher class, called a *genus*, to which we give a name; which name belongs equally to every species comprehended in the genus, and to every individual comprehended in the several species. Thus all the tribes of living things resemble each other in this respect, that they have life; whence we refer them to a *genus* called *animal;* and this name belongs equally to every *species* of animals, to men, beasts, fishes, fowls, and insects, and to each *individual* man, beast, fish, fowl, and insect.

18. Further, All things animated and inanimate resemble each other in this respect, that they are created; whence we refer them to a genus still higher, which may be called *creature:* a name which belongs equally to every *genus* and *species* of created things, and to each *individual* thing that is created. Further still, all beings whatever exist, or *are*, and in this respect may be said to

resemble each other: in which view we refer them to a genus still higher, called *being*, which is the highest possible genus.

19. The English word *kind* is said to have been originally of the same import with *genus*, and *sort* the same with *species*. But the words *kind* and *sort* have long been confounded by our best writers; and hence, when we would speak accurately on this subject, we are obliged to take the words *genus* and *species* from another language. All those thoughts or conceptions of the mind, which we express by names significant of *genera* and *species*, may be called *general ideas*, and have been by some philosophers called *ideas* simply. And those thoughts or conceptions, which we express by proper names, or by general names so qualified by pronouns as to denote individual things or persons, may be called *singular* or *particular ideas*, and were by some English writers of the last century termed *notions*. In this sense of the words, one has a *notion* of *Socrates*, *Etna*, *this town*, *that house;* and an *idea* of *man*, *mountain*, *house*, *town*. It were to be wished, that the words *idea* and *notion* had been still thus distinguished; but they have long been applied to other purposes. And now *idea* seems to express a clearer, and *notion* a fainter, conception.

20. Of the manner in which the mind forms general ideas, so much has been said by metaphysical writers, that without great expense of time, not even an abridgment of it could be given: and I apprehend it would not be easy to make such an abridgment useful, or even intelligible. It appears to me, that, as all things are individuals, all thoughts must be so too. A thought therefore is still but one thought; and cannot, as such, have that universality in its appearance, which a general term has in its signification. In short, as I understand the words, to have general ideas, or general conceptions, is nothing more, than to know the meaning and use of general terms, or common appellatives. Proper names occur in language much more seldom than general terms. And therefore, if we had not this faculty of arranging things according to their *genera* and *species*, general terms would not be understood, and consequently language (as already observed) would be impossible.

21. There is another sort of abstraction, which affects both our thinking and our speaking; and takes place, when we consider any quality of a thing separately from the thing itself, and speak and think of it as if it were itself a thing, and capable of being characterised by qualities. Thus from *beautiful animal*, *moving animal*, *cruel animal*, separate the qualities, and make nouns of them.

and they become *beauty*, *motion*, *cruelty;* which are called in grammar *abstract nouns;* and which, as if they stood for real things, may be characterised by qualities, *great beauty*, *swift motion*, *barbarous cruelty*. These qualities, too, may be abstracted and changed into nouns, *greatness*, *swiftness*, *barbarity*, &c. Of these abstract nouns there are multitudes in every language.

SECTION II.

Of the Faculty of Speech.

22. The philosophy of speech is an important and curious part of science. In treating of it, I shall, first, explain the origin and general nature of speech; and, secondly, consider the essentials of language, by showing how many sorts of words are necessary for expressing all the varieties of human thought, and what is the nature and use of each particular sort.

Origin and general Nature of Speech.

23. Man is the only animal that can speak. For speech implies the arrangement and separation of our thoughts; and this is the work of reason and reflection. Articulate sounds resembling

speech may be uttered by parrots, by ravens, and even by machines; but this is not speech, because it implies neither reflection, nor reason, nor any separation of successive thoughts; because, in a word, the machine or parrot does not, and cannot, understand the meaning of what it is thus made to utter.

24. The *natural* voices of brute animals are not, however, without meaning. But they differ from speech in these three respects. First, man speaks by art and imitation; whereas brutes utter their voices without being taught, that is, by the instinct of their nature. Secondly, the voices of brutes are not separable into simple elementary sounds, as the speech of man is; nor do they admit of that amazing variety whereof our articulate voices are susceptible. And, thirdly, they seem to express, not separate thoughts or ideas, but such feelings, pleasant or painful, as it may be necessary, for the good of those animals, or for the benefit of man, that they should have the power of uttering.

25. We learn to speak, by imitating the speech of others; so that he who is born quite deaf, and continues so, must of necessity be dumb. Instances there have been of persons, who had heard in the beginning of life and afterwards became deaf, using a strange sort of language, made up

partly of words they had learned, and partly of other words they had invented. Such persons could guess at the meaning of what was spoken to them in their own dialect, by looking the speaker in the face, and observing the lips, and those other parts of the face, which are put in motion by speaking.

26. We speak, in order to make our thoughts known to others. Now thoughts themselves are not visible, nor can they be perceived by any outward sense. If, therefore, I make my thoughts perceptible to another man, it must be by means of signs, which he and I understand in the same sense. The signs that express human thought, so as to make it known to others, are of two sorts, natural and artificial.

27. The natural signs of thought are those outward appearances in the eyes, complexion, features, gesture, and voice, which accompany certain emotions of the mind, and which, being common to all men, are universally understood. For example, uplifted hands and eyes, with bended knees, are in every part of the world known to signify earnest entreaty; fiery eyes, wrinkled brows, quick motions, and loud voice, betoken anger; paleness and trembling are signs of fear, tears of sorrow, laughter of merriment, &c. Compared with the multitude of our thoughts.

these natural signs are but few, and therefore insufficient for the purposes of speech. Hence artificial signs have been universally adopted, which derive their meaning from human contrivance, and are not understood except by those who have been taught the use of them.

28. These artificial signs may be divided into visible and audible. The former are used by dumb men; by ships that sail in company; and sometimes by people at land, who, by means of fire and other signals, communicate intelligence from one place to another: but for the ordinary purposes of life such contrivances would be inconvenient and insufficient. And therefore audible signs, performed by the human voice, are in all nations used in order to communicate thought. For the human voice has an endless variety of expression, and is in all its varieties easily managed, and distinctly perceptible by the human ear, in darkness as well as in light.

29. Human voice is air sent out from the lungs, and by the windpipe conveyed through the aperture of the larynx, where the breath operates upon the membranous lips of that aperture, so as to produce distinct and audible sound; in a way resembling that in which the lips of the reed of a hautboy produce musical sound when one blows into them. We may indeed breathe strongly,

without uttering what is called voice: and, in order to transform our breath into vocal sound, it seems necessary, that, by an act of our will, which long practice has rendered habitual, we should convey a sort of tenseness to the parts through which the breath passes. New born infants do this instinctively; which changes their breathing, when stronger than usual, into crying. And persons in great pain do the same; which transforms their breathing into groans.

30. The aperture of the larynx is called the *glottis*, and, when we swallow food or drink, is covered with a lid called the *epi-glottis*. As our voice rises in its tone, the glottis becomes narrower, and wider as the voice becomes more grave or deep. Now any ordinary human voice may sound a great variety of tones; and each variety of tone is occasioned by a variation in the diameter of the glottis. And therefore, the muscles and fibres, that minister to the motion of these parts, must be exceedingly minute and delicate.

31. One may use one's voice without articulation; as when one sings a tune without applying syllables to it: in which case the vocal organs perform no other part than that of a wind instrument of musick. But speech is made up of *articulate voices:* and articulation is performed by those

parts of the throat and mouth, which the voice passes through in its way from the larynx to the open air; namely, by the tongue, palate, throat, lips, and nostrils. Speech is articulated voice: whispering is articulated breath.

32. Of vocal articulated sounds the simplest are those which proceed through an open mouth, and which are called vowel sounds. In transmitting these, the opening of the mouth may be pretty large, or somewhat smaller, or very small; and thus three different vowel sounds may be formed, each of which may admit of three varieties, according as the voice, in its passage through the inside of the mouth, is acted upon by the lips, the tongue, or the throat. In this way, nine simple vowel sounds may be produced. There are ten in the English tongue, though we have not a vowel letter for each. Indeed our alphabet of vowels is very imperfect. In other languages there may be vowel sounds different from any we have: that of the French *u* is one.

33. When the voice in its passage through the mouth is *totally intercepted* by the articulating organs coming together, or *strongly compressed* by their near approach to one another, there is formed another sort of articulation, which in writing is marked by a character called a consonant. Now silence is the effect of a total interception of the

voice, and indistinctness of sound is produced by a strong compression of it. And therefore, a consonant can have no distinct sound, unless it be preceded or followed by a vowel, or opening of the mouth.

34. The variety of consonants, formed by a total interception of the voice, may be thus accounted for. The voice, in its passage through the inside of the mouth, may be *totally intercepted* by the lips, or by the tongue and palate, or by the tongue and throat; and each of these interceptions may happen, when the voice is directed to go out by the mouth only, or by the nose only, or partly by the mouth and partly by the nose. In this way we form nine primitive consonants; which are divided into mutes, P, T, K; semimutes, B, D, and G as sounded in *egg;* and semivowels, M, N, and that sound of NG which is heard in *king*, and which, though we mark it by two letters, is as simple a sound as any other. The mutes are so called, because their sound instantly and totally ceases on bringing the organs together; the semimutes, because a little faint sound is heard in the nostrils, or roof of the mouth, after the organs intercept the voice; and the semivowels, because their sound, escaping through the nostrils, may be continued for a considerable time after the voice is intercepted.

35. When the voice, directed to go out by the mouth only, or by the mouth and nose jointly, is not totally intercepted, but *strongly compressed*, in its passage, there is formed another class of consonants, which are the aspirations of the mutes and semimutes. Thus P is changed into F; B into V; T into that sound of TH which is heard in *thing;* D into that sound of TH which is heard in *this*, *that*, *thine*. The semivowels do not admit of aspiration, or at least are not aspirated in our language. And we have some irregular consonants, that cannot be accounted for according to this mode of arrangement, as L and R, S and SH; and in other tongues there may be consonant as well as vowel sounds, with which we are not acquainted.

36. In English the simple elementary sounds are thirty-two or thirty-three; namely, ten vowels, and twenty-two or twenty-three consonants. Our alphabet, therefore, if it were perfect, would consist of thirty-two or thirty-three letters. But, like other alphabets, it is imperfect, having several unnecessary letters, and wanting some which it ought to have. Our spelling is equally imperfect; for many of our words have letters which are not sounded at all; and the same letter has not in every word the same sound. Hence some ingenious men have thought of reforming our alpha-

bet, by introducing new letters; and our spelling, by striking off such as are unnecessary, and writing as we speak. But both schemes are unwise, because they would involve our laws and literature in confusion; and impracticable, because pronunciation is liable to change, and no two provinces in the British empire have exactly the same pronunciation.

37. By attending to those motions of the articulating organs, whereby the elementary sounds of speech are formed, an art has been invented, of teaching those to speak who do not hear. But it is most laborious, and by no means useful; for the articulation of such persons is so uncouth, as to give horrour rather than pleasure to the hearer. The time, therefore, that is employed in this study, might be laid out to better purpose, in teaching those unfortunate persons the use of written language, the art of drawing, and a convenient system of visible signs for the communication of thought. Every necessary letter of the alphabet might be signified by pointing to a certain joint of the fingers, or to some other part of the hand; and the more common words, by other visible signs of the same nature: and such a contrivance, when a dumb man becomes expert in it, and has learned to read and spell, would be of very great use to him.

38. By combining consonants with consonants, and with vowels and diphthongs, an endless variety of syllables, and consequently of words, may be formed. In English, exclusive of proper names, and of words derived from them, the number of words does not amount to fifty thousand; but most of them have several, and some of them many significations. Two vowels coalescing in one syllable, so as to form a double vowel sound, make what is called a diphthong as *ou* in *round*, *ui* in *juice;* and sometimes a diphthongal sound is expressed by a single vowel letter, as *u* in *muse*, *i* in *mind*, and sometimes by three vowel letters, as *eau* in *beauty*, *ieu* in *lieu*.

39. As much speech as we pronounce with one effort of the articulating organs, is called a syllable. It may be a single vowel, as *a*, *o;* or a diphthong, as *oi;* or either of these modified by one, or more consonants, placed before it, or after it, or on both sides of it; as *to*, *of*, *toy*, *oyl*, *toft*, *cuff*, *boil*, *broils*, *swift*, *strength*, &c. The least part of language that has a meaning is a word; and words derive their meaning from common use: and it is both our interest and our duty, to use them in the common acceptation.

40. Some words are long, and others short. Those that are in continual use, as articles, pronouns, auxiliary words, prepositions, and con-

junctions, ought to be short, and generally are so. Primitive words are in most languages short; which proves, that those authors are mistaken who affirm, on the authority of some travellers, that barbarous languages abound in long words. Such travellers probably mistook a description or circumlocution for a single word; and as the voice in speaking does not make a pause at the end of each word, it is not unnatural for those, who hear what they do not understand, to mistake two or more successive words for one. Short words do not make style inharmonious, or insipid, unless they be in themselves harsh, or of little meaning.

41. Words alone do not constitute speech: *emphasis* and *accent* belong to all languages. The former is of two sorts; the emphasis of words, and the emphasis of syllables. The first is a stronger exertion of the voice laid upon some words, in order to distinguish the more significant parts of a sentence. The last is an energy of the voice laid upon some syllables of a word more than upon others, because custom has so determined.

42. The first, which may be called the rhetorical emphasis, is necessary to make spoken language perfectly intelligible. For if the speaker or reader misapply the emphasis, by laying the force of his voice upon the less significant, or

not laying it on the more significant words, the hearer must in many cases mistake the meaning. And no person in reading can apply the emphasis properly, unless he read slowly, be continually attentive, and understand the full import of every word he utters. Children therefore, while learning to read, ought to read nothing but what they perfectly understand. The emphasis of speech is by most grammarians called *accent;* but accent is quite a different thing.

43. Accent is the *tone* with which one speaks. For, in speaking, the voice of every man is sometimes more grave in the sound, and at other times more acute or shrill. Accent is related to musick or song; as appears in the formation of the Latin word, from *ad* and *cantus*, and in that of the correspondent Greek term προσωδια, from προς and ωδη. Many people are insensible of the tone with which themselves and their neighbours speak; but all perceive the tone of a stranger who comes from a considerable distance: and if his tone seem in any degree uncouth or unpleasant to them, theirs it is likely is equally so to him. This at least is true of provincial accents. That accent, and that pronunciation, is generally in every country accounted the best, which is used in the metropolis by the most polite and learned persons.

44. The Greeks used in writing certain marks called accents, in order to make the tones of their language of more easy acquisition to foreigners: and those still remain in their books; but we can make no use of them, because we know not in what way they regulated the voice. Every language, and almost every provincial dialect, is distinguished by peculiarities of tone; and nothing is more difficult than to acquire those tones of language that one has not learned in early life: so that the native country, and even the native province, of a stranger, may be known by his accent; which in both publick and private life is frequently an advantage.

45. We learn to speak when our organs are most flexible, and our powers of imitation most active; that is, when we are infants: and, even then, this is no easy acquisition; being the effect of constant practice continued every day, for some years, from morning to night. Were we never to attempt speech till grown up, there is reason to think, that we should never learn to speak at all. And therefore, if there ever was a time when all mankind were dumb, *mutum et turpe pecus*, as Epicurus taught, all mankind must, in the ordinary course of things, have continued dumb to this day. For speech could not be *necessary* to animals who were supposed to have existed for

ages without it; and among such animals the invention of unnecessary and difficult arts, whereof they saw no example in the world around them, was not to be expected. And speech, if invented at all by them, must have been invented either by dumb infants who were incapable of invention, or by dumb men who were incapable of speech. Mankind, therefore, must have spoken in all ages; the young constantly learning to speak by imitating those who were older. And if so, our first parents must have received this art, as well as some others, by inspiration.

46. Moses informs us, that the first language continued to be spoken by all mankind till the building of Babel, that is, for about two thousand years. But, on that occasion, a miraculous confusion of languages took place; which must have immediately divided the human race into tribes or nations, as they only would choose to keep together who understood one another; and which accounts for the great variety of primitive tongues now in the world. By primitive tongues I mean those, which having no resemblance to any other tongue in the sound of their words, are not supposed to be derived from any other. Greek and Latin resemble one another not a little; whence it is probable, that both were derived from some primitive tongue more ancient than either. The

modern languages of France, Spain, Italy, and Portugal, resemble one another very much; and we know they are in a great measure derived from the ancient Latin.

47. But there is no reason to think, that at Babel any other material alteration was introduced into human nature. And as men ever since have had the same faculties, and been placed in the same or similar circumstances, it may be presumed, that the modes of human thought must have been much the same from that time forward; and, consequently, as speech arises from thought, that all languages must have some resemblance, in structure at least, if not in sound. Those particulars in which all languages resemble one another, must be essential to language. The *essentials of language* I shall proceed to consider, when I have made a remark or two on speech made visible by writing.

48. A word is an audible and articulate sign of thought: a letter is a visible sign of an articulate sound. Every man can speak who hears, and men have spoken in all ages; but in many nations the art of writing is still unknown. For before men can invent writing, they must divide their speech into words, and subdivide their words into simple elementary sounds, assigning to each sound a particular visible symbol: which, though

easy to us, because we know the art, is never thought of by savages, and has been overlooked, or not sufficiently attended to, by some nations of very long standing. By means of writing, human thoughts may be made more durable than any other work of man; may be circulated in all nations; and may be so corrected, compared, and compounded, as to exhibit within a moderate compass the accumulated wisdom of many ages. It is therefore needless to enlarge upon the usefulness of this art, as the means of ascertaining, methodising, preserving, and extending human knowledge.

49. There is reason to think, that this art must have been in the world from very early times, and that the use of an alphabet was known before the hieroglyphicks of Egypt were invented. These last were probably contrived for the purpose of expressing mysteries of religion and government in a way not intelligible to the vulgar. For a hieroglyphick is a sort of riddle addressed to the eye; as if the figure of a circle were carved on a pillar, in order to represent eternity; a lamp, to denote life; an eye on the top of a sceptre, to signify a sovereign. Such conceits imply refinement rather than simplicity, and the disguise rather than the exhibition of thought; and therefore seem to have been the contrivance of men,

who were in quest not of a necessary, but of a mysterious art; who had leisure to be witty and allegorical; who *could* express their thoughts plainly, but did not choose to do it.

50. In China they understand writing and printing too, and have done so, we are told, for many ages: but to this day they have not invented an alphabet, at least their men of learning use none. They are said to have a distinct character for each of their words, about fourscore thousand in all; which makes it impossible for a foreigner, and extremely difficult to a native, to understand their written language. In very early times, men wrote, by engraving on stone; afterwards, by tracing out figures with a coloured liquid upon wood, the bark of trees, the Egyptian papyrus manufactured into a sort of paper, the skins of goats, sheep, and calves, made into parchment: in a word, different contrivances have been adopted in different ages, and by different nations. Pens, ink, and paper, as we use them, are said to have been introduced into these parts of the world about six hundred years ago.

51. The first printing known in Europe was, like that of the Chinese (from whom, however, our printers did not borrow it), by blocks of wood, whereon were engraved all the characters of every page. This art is supposed to have been

invented in Germany, or in Flanders, about the year 1420. Printing with movable types was found out about thirty years later, and is a very great improvement upon the former method. By means of this wonderful art, books are multiplied to such a degree, that every family (I had almost said every person) may now have a bible; which, when manuscripts only were in use, every parish could hardly afford to have; as the expense of writing out so great a book would be at least equal to that of building an ordinary country church. This one example may suggest a hint for estimating the importance of the art of printing.

52. Within less than a century after it was invented, printing was brought to perfection in France, by the illustrious Robert Stephen and his son Henry; who were not only the greatest of printers, but also the most learned men of modern times; and to whom, for their beautiful and correct editions of the classicks, and for their dictionaries of the Greek and Latin tongues, every modern scholar is under very great obligations.

this, *that*, &c. Others are termed subjunctive or relative, because they subjoin a clause or sentence to something previous, as *qui*, *quæ*, *quod*, *who*, *which*, *that*. This sort of pronoun has the import of both a pronoun and a copulative conjunction, and may be resolved into *et ille*, *et illa*, *et illud*.

59. In conversation, the person who speaks is first and chiefly attended to, and the person spoken to is next. Hence *ego*, *I*, is called the pronoun of the first person; *tu*, *thou*, of the second; and, as distinguished from these, *he*, *she*, and *it*, are called pronouns of the third person. Those of the first and second need no distinction of gender, as the sex of the speakers is obvious to each other from the voice, dress, &c. But the pronoun of the third person must have gender, *ille*, *illa*, *illud*, *he*, *she*, *it;* because what is spoken of may be absent, and consequently its sex not obvious; or may be not a person, but a thing, and consequently of neither sex. The pronouns of all the three persons must have number; because the speaker, the hearer, or the thing or person spoken of, may be either one or more than one. Pronouns are not numerous in any language, very few being sufficient for all occasions on which they become necessary. The different classes of them are well enough distinguished in the common grammars.

60. Of Attributes. These are words which denote the attributes, qualities, and operations, of things and persons. They form a very numerous class, and were by the ancient grammarians called ῥήματα, *verba*, whatever may be said or affirmed concerning persons or things. Thus of a man it may be said, that he is *good*, that he *speaks*, or that he is *walking*. Attributes are of three sorts, adjectives, verbs, and participles. An adjective, or epithet, denotes a quality, and nothing more; as *good*, *bad*, *black*, *white*. Verbs and participles denote qualities too, but with the addition of something else, as will appear by and by.

61. It is strange, that in all the common grammars the adjective should be considered as a noun. It is no more a noun than it is a verb. Nay, verbs and adjectives are of nearer affinity than nouns and adjectives. For the verb and adjective agree in this, that both express qualities or attributes; whereas the noun is the name of the thing to which qualities or attributes belong. And therefore the term *adjective-noun* is as improper as if we were to say *participle-noun*, or *verb-noun*.

62. In many languages it is a rule, that the adjective must agree with its noun in gender, number, and case: and where adjectives have gender, number, and case, the rule is reasonable and natural. But it is not so in all languages. English adjectives have neither gender nor number; but, like

indeclinable Latin adjectives (as *frugi*, *centum*, *nequam*), are invariably the same. We say, a good man, a good woman, a good thing; good men, good women, good things; without making any change in the adjective: and in this syntax we feel no inconvenience. And the same thing is true of English participles.

63. One variation, however, those English adjectives require, which in their signification admit of the distinctions of *more* and *less*. This paper is white, and snow is white, but snow is whiter than this paper. Solon was wise, Socrates wiser, Solomon the wisest of men. The degrees are innumerable in which different things may possess the same quality: it is impossible to say with precision, how much wiser Solomon was than Socrates, or by how many degrees snow is whiter than this paper. But in human art there is no infinity; and, therefore, we cannot in language have degrees of comparison to express all possible varieties of more and less.

64. Two degrees of comparison, the comparative and superlative, are all that seem to be necessary; and, for expressing these, different nations may have different contrivances: what is called the positive degree is the simple form of the adjective, and expresses neither degree nor comparison. Participles admit not of the varia-

tion we speak of: when they seem to assume it, as when we say *doctus*, *doctior*, *doctissimus*, they cease to be participles, and become adjectives. Some adverbs admit of this variety, as *diu*, *diutius*, *diutissime*. Verbs too may express degrees of comparison, but do it by means of auxiliary adverbs; as, *magis amat*, *vehementissime amat*.

65. The comparative degree denotes superiority, and implies a comparison of one, or more, persons, or things, with another, or with others, that is, or are, set in opposition; Solomon was wiser than Socrates; the Athenians were more learned than the Thebans; he is more intelligent than all his teachers. There are two superlatives; one implying comparison, and each denoting eminence or superiority. We use the former when we say, Solomon was the wisest of men; where Solomon is compared to a species of beings of whom he is said to be one. We use the latter, when we say, Solomon was a very wise, or a most wise man. In these last sentences, comparison, though remotely insinuated, is not, as in the former example, expressly asserted.

66. Of Verbs. Man is endowed, not only with senses to perceive, and memory to retain, but also with judgment, whereby we compare things and thoughts together, so as to make affirmations concerning them. When we say, So-

general. We are now to consider more particularly the several faculties comprehended in it. And first of memory.

SECTION VI.

Of Memory.

122. This is that faculty, by which we acquire experience and knowledge; and without which we should, at the end of the longest life, be as ignorant as at its beginning. Memory presents to us ideas or thoughts of what is past, accompanied with a persuasion that they were formerly real and present. What we distinctly remember to have seen we as firmly believe to have happened, as what is now present to our senses.

123. A sound state of the brain is no doubt necessary to the right exercise of both memory and judgment. And hence perhaps it is, that some philosophers have held, that all our perceptions and thoughts leave upon the brain certain marks or traces, which continue there for some time, and when attended to by the mind occasion remembrance; but that, when the brain is disordered by drunkenness, or any other dis-

ease, so as not to receive or retain such marks, or so as to receive or retain them imperfectly, there is then no remembrance, or a confused one. But this is mere conjecture, incapable of proof, and indeed absurd. For how thoughts of the mind, which are surely no corporeal things, should leave upon the brain, which is corporeal, particular stamps, variously sized and shaped according to the nature of the thoughts, and how the mind should take notice of those stamps, or remember by means of them, is altogether inconceivable. We know that we do remember; but of the immediate cause of remembrance we know nothing.

124. When we remember with little or no effort, it is called remembrance simply, or memory, and sometimes passive memory: when we endeavour to remember what does not immediately and (as it were) of itself occur, it is called active memory, or recollection. A ready recollection of our knowledge, at the moment when we have occasion for it, is a talent of the greatest importance. The man possessed of it is generally of good parts, and seldom fails to distinguish himself, whatever sort of business he may be engaged in. But some persons, who are remarkable for what is here called passive memory, and can remember all the words of a long discourse on once hear-

ing it, are, in other respects, of no great abilities. Brutes have memory, but of recollection they seem to be incapable; for this requires rationality, and the power of contemplating and arranging our thoughts. Great memory is perhaps necessary to form great genius, but is not always a proof of it.

125. The liveliest remembrance is not so lively as the sensation that produced it; and ideas of memory do often, but not always, decay more and more, as the original sensation becomes more and more remote in time. Those sensations, and those thoughts, have a chance to be long remembered, which are lively at first; and those are likely to be most lively, which are most attended to, or which are accompanied with pleasure or pain, or with wonder, surprise, curiosity, merriment, and other lively passions.

126. The art of memory, therefore, is little more than the art of attention. What we wish to remember we should attend to so as to understand it perfectly, fixing our view particularly upon its importance or singular nature; that it may raise within us some of the passions above mentioned: and we should also beforehand disengage our mind from other things, that we may the more effectually attend to the new

object which we wish to remember; that being apt to be forgotten which occurs to us when we are taken up with other things. The memories of children should be continually exercised; but to oblige them to get by heart what they do not understand, perverts their faculties, gives them a dislike to learning, and confirms them in habits of inattention, and inaccurate pronunciation.

127. A habit of strictly attending to that, whatever it is, in which we happen to be engaged, and of doing only one thing at one time, is of great importance to intellectual improvement. It produces clearness and readiness of comprehension, presence of mind, accuracy of knowledge, and facility of expression. Attention to our company is a principal part of politeness, and renders their conversation and behaviour both amusing and instructive to us. We ought, therefore, to be constantly on our guard against contracting any of those habits of indolence, or a wandering mind, which, when long persisted in, form what is called an absent man.

128. Our thoughts have, for the most part, a connection; so that the thought which is just now in the mind, depends partly upon that which went before, and partly serves to introduce that which follows. Hence we remember best those things

whose parts are methodically disposed, and mutually connected. A regular discourse makes a more lasting impression upon the hearer than a parcel of detached sentences, and gives to his rational powers a more salutary exercise: and this may show us the propriety of conducting our studies, and all our affairs, according to a regular plan or method. When this is not done, our thoughts and our business, especially if in any degree complex, soon run into confusion.

129. The Greek and Roman orators, who sometimes had occasion to deliver very long orations, and all from memory, took pains to fix in their minds a series of objects or places naturally connected, such as the contiguous houses in a street, or the contiguous apartments in a house. By long habit, these places were so arranged in their memory, that when the first place occurred to them, it introduced the idea of the second, and the second the third, and so forward; even as when the first letter of the alphabet, or the beginning of a well known tune, occurs to the mind, it introduces the subsequent letters and notes in the proper order. Then the orator connected the first head of his discourse with the first of these places, the second with the second, &c. by thinking of both at the same time. And thus they were enabled to recollect,

without confusion, all the parts of the longest discourse. This was called the artificial memory. Cicero and Quintilian both speak of it, but neither of them so minutely as to make it perfectly intelligible, at least to me: nor do I know that any modern orator has ever made use of it. It seems, indeed, to have been a laborious way of improving memory; as Quintilian himself acknowledges. In allusion to it, we still call the parts of a discourse *places* or *topics*, and say, *in the first place*, *in the second place*, &c.

130. What we perceive by two senses at once has a good chance to be remembered. Hence to read aloud, slowly, and with propriety, when one is accustomed to it, contributes greatly to remembrance. And that which we write in a good hand, without contractions, with dark coloured ink, exactly pointed and spelled, in straight lines with a moderate space between them, and properly subdivided into paragraphs as the subject may require, is better remembered than what we throw together in confusion. For, by all these circumstances, attention is fixed, and the writing, being better understood, makes a deeper impression. Those things also, which are related in two or more respects, are more easily remembered than such as are related in one respect only. Hence, by most

people, verse is more easily remembered than prose, because the words are related in measure as well as in sense; and rhyme than blank verse, because the words are related not only in sense, and measure, but also by similar sounds at the end of the lines. And, in general, elegant and harmonious language is better remembered, than what is harsh and incorrect.

131. Memories differ greatly both in kind and in degree. One man remembers best one sort of things, and another another; which may, in part, be owing to habits contracted of attending to one sort of things more than to another: and this may be assigned as one cause of the varieties of genius that are observable among mankind. In the early part of life, memory is commonly strong; for then the mind is disengaged, curiosity active, the spirits high, and the agreeable passions predominant. Infants easily remember, and as easily forget. A child of six years, going into a foreign country, acquires the new language, and forgets his own, in a few months. Most things are easily learned in the first part of life, especially languages. In mature age, curiosity is abated, and the spirits less lively than in youth: but men are then more capable of strict attention, and both the memory and the judgment must be considerably im-

proved by experience and long exercise. In old age, curiosity is still more abated, and few things yield amusement, or are much attended to; and therefore memory is for the most part weak, except in regard to transactions long since past, or peculiarly suited to the present disposition.

132. To improve this faculty, we must, as already observed, cultivate habits of strict attention, not only when we read books, or hear discourses, but also in conversation, and in every part of our daily business. It will also be prudent to study according to a plan, to dispose our affairs methodically, and to study nothing but what may be useful. To read a great variety of books is not necessary; but those we read should all be good ones; and we shall do well to read them slowly and considerately, often recollecting what we have read, and meditating upon it; and we should never leave a good author till we be masters of both his language and his doctrine. A list will be given hereafter of some of those books in Greek, Latin, and English, that deserve to be studied in this accurate manner. For, as Bacon well observes, "some books are "to be read only in parts; others to be read, but "not curiously; and *some few* to be read wholly, "with diligence and attention." There is much

good sense in the following aphorism of the same great author: "Reading makes a full man, "writing an exact man, and conversation a ready "man."

133. It is hardly credible to what a degree both active and passive remembrance may be improved by long practice. There are clergymen who can get a sermon by heart in two hours, though their memory, when they began to exercise it, was rather weak than strong. And pleaders, and other orators who speak in publick and *extempore*, often discover, in calling instantly to mind all the knowledge necessary on the present occasion, and every thing of importance that may have been advanced in the course of a long debate, such powers of retention and of recollection as, to the man who has never been obliged to exert himself in the same manner, are altogether astonishing.

134. Frequently to revise our knowledge; to talk about it when we have a convenient opportunity, that is, when we are in the company of those who may wish to hear us talk about it; to teach it to others; to reduce it to practice as much as possible; and to set down in writing, not on loose papers, but in books kept for the purpose, whatever may occur to us on any subject, would greatly improve both our memory

and our judgment. To transcribe literally from books is of little use, or rather of none; for it employs much time, without improving any one of our faculties. But to write an abridgment of a good book may sometimes be a very profitable exercise. In general, when we would preserve the doctrines, sentiments, or facts, that occur in reading, it will be prudent to lay the book aside, and put them in writing in our own words. This practice will give accuracy to our knowledge, accustom us to recollection, improve us in the use of language, and enable us so thoroughly to comprehend the thoughts of other men as to make them, in some measure, our own.

135. The memory of brutes seems to serve them no further, than is necessary to the preservation of them and their offspring, and for making them useful to man. In some of them it is attended with extraordinary circumstances. Bees, for example, can see but a very little way before them, as appears from the extreme convexity of their eyes: and yet find their way, from a long excursion, to their respective homes, and seldom or never mistake a neighbouring hive for their own. In this they must be guided, not only by memory, but also by smell, or rather by some other instinct whereof we have no conception. Yet, with all the helps

that he derives from instinct, or from more acute organs of sense, the memory of the most sagacious brute is to that of men almost infinitely inferiour. Many brutes are quite untractable; of such the memory must be very limited. Those that are docile soon reach the height of improvement; and the arts and habits which it is in our power to impress upon them are but few. Destitute of consciousness, of reason, of recollection, of conversation, and of the powers of invention and arrangement, the extent of their knowledge must be extremely small, and their memory proportionable. Of abstract notions in regard to truth and falsehood, virtue and vice, elegance and deformity, proportions in quantity and number, law, government, religion, commerce, and other sciences and arts, which are the most important parts of human knowledge, they are utterly ignorant: nor can they ever know any thing of what has happened in time past, is likely to happen in the time to come, or is now happening at a distance.

136. But to the power of human memory, and to the possible extent of human knowledge, we can set no bounds. And what is very remarkable, the more real knowledge we acquire, the greater is our desire of knowledge, and the greater our capacity of receiving it. In a word, we seem

to be susceptible of endless improvement: which is a proof, not only of the immense superiority of our nature to that of other animals, but also that our souls are formed for endless duration.

SECTION VII.

Of Imagination.

137. I *REMEMBER* to have seen a lion; I can *imagine* a griffin or a centaur though I never saw one: he who uses these words with understanding *knows* the difference between imagination and memory, though perhaps he may not be able to *explain* it. When we remember, we have a view to real existence and past experience: when we *imagine*, we contemplate a notion or idea simply as it is in itself, or as we conceive it to be, without referring it to past experience or to real existence. Some writers limit the word *imagination* to the mental conception of *images* or things visible; and this may perhaps have been the original meaning of the word: but the modern use of language will justify that more general application of the term which is here given. For it would be improper to say, that men born blind must be destitute of

imagination: such men may surely *invent* as well as *dream;* it is well known they can do both: and both invention and dreaming are referred to this faculty. Imagination employed in its more trivial exertions is often called fancy. A sublime poet is a man of vast imagination: a witty author is a person of lively fancy.

138. That we may see more particularly the nature of the faculty in question, it is proper to observe here, that all things may be divided into *simple* and *complex*. The former do not seem to consist of parts that can be separated; and such are our sensations of heat, cold, hunger, thirst, or of any particular sound, or simple colour. Complex things consist of parts, which may be separated and conceived separately: such are all bodies. Now all our simple ideas, that is, all our notions of simple objects, are derived from experience: a man must have *seen* colour, and light, and *heard* sound, and *felt* the pain of hunger, before he can conceive what those things are. But complex ideas, or notions of complex objects, the mind can form for itself, by supposing a number of simple or complex notions or things combined together in one assemblage. When such complex ideas are not derived from memory, we refer them to the imagination. No man ever saw a mountain of ivory; but he, who

has seen ivory and a mountain, may easily *imagine* the substance of the one extended to the size and shape of the other, and thus form the idea of an ivory mountain.

139. Memory suggests nothing to us but what we have really perceived; so that a being endowed with memory, but destitute of imagination, could never invent any thing: as all invention implies novelty, and that certain things or thoughts are put together which were never so put together before. Now this inventing power is ascribed, as observed already, to the imagination or fancy, and, when regulated by good sense and applied to useful purposes, is called *genius*. One may be learned who is not ingenious; in other words, one may have a good memory well stored with knowledge, and yet have little imagination or invention; as, on the other hand, one may be very ingenious with little learning. But genius and learning, when they meet in one person, are mutually and greatly assistant to each other; and, in the poetical art, Horace declares that either without the other can do little.

140. The succession of our thoughts is often regulated by memory; as when we go over in our mind the particulars of a place we have seen, of a conversation we have heard, or of a

book we have read. At other times, when our attention is not fixed on any one thing, a state of mind called a *reverie*, we may observe, that our thoughts are continually changing, so that in a little time our imagination wanders to something very different from that which we were thinking of just before. Yet if we could remember every thing that passed through our mind during this reverie, we should probably find, that there was some relation, connection, or bond of union, between those thoughts that accompanied, or came next after, one another. The relations, or bonds of union, which thus determine the mind to associate ideas, are various.

141. First, *resemblance* is an associating quality: that is, when we perceive, or think of, any thing, it is natural for us, at the same time, or immediately after, to think of something that is *like* it. When we hear a story, or see a person, we are apt to think of other *similar* stories or persons. Our discourse we often embellish with metaphors, allegories, and those other figures of speech, that are founded in likeness. And when any powerful passion, as anger or sorrow, takes hold of the mind, the thoughts that occur to us have generally a resemblance to that passion, and tend to encourage it.

142. *Contrariety*, or *contrast*, is another associating principle, especially when the mind is in a disagreeable state. Great cold makes us think of heat, and wish for it. Hunger and thirst put us in mind of eating and drinking. In poetry, and other works of fancy, we are sometimes pleased when we find things of *opposite* natures succeeding each other; when, for example, the *hurry* of a *battle* is interrupted, as in Homer it often is, with a descriptive similitude taken from *still life* or *rural affairs;* or when, in the same fable, persons appear of *opposite* characters, and the violent is opposed to the gentle, the cunning to the generous, and the rash to the prudent.

143. Thirdly: when we think of any place which we are acquainted with, we are apt to think at the same time of the *neighbouring* places and persons: here the associating principle is *contiguity*, or *nearness of situation*. The sight of a house, in which we have formerly been happy or unhappy, renews the agreeable or disagreeable ideas that were formerly realized there. Hence, in part, arises that partiality which most people have for the town, province, or country, in which they passed their early years. Hence, on entering a church, even when nobody is present, a considerate mind is apt to

feel some of those religious impressions which it has formerly experienced in such places: and sentiments of a different nature arise, when we go into playhouses, ballrooms, or apartments that we have seen appropriated to purposes of festivity.

144. Fourthly: things related as *cause and effect* do mutually suggest each other to the mind. When we see a wound, we think of the weapon or the accident that caused it, and of the pain which is the effect of it. The idea of snow or of ice brings along with it that of cold; and we can hardly think of the sun without thinking of light and heat at the same time. The associations founded on this principle are equally strong, whether the causation be real or imaginary. He who believes that darkness and solitude are the cause of the appearance of ghosts, will find, when he is in the dark and alone, that the idea of such beings will occur to him as naturally, as if the one were really the cause of the other. It is true, that solitude and darkness may reasonably produce some degree of fear; because where we cannot see we must be in some danger; and, when every thing is silent about us, we must be at some distance from the protection and other comforts of society. But ghosts and apparitions have nothing more to do with

darkness than with light: and the stories told of them will be found, on examination, to arise, either from imperfect sensations owing to the darkness, or from those horrours which disorder the imagination when one is very much afraid, or from the folly, credulity, or falsehood of them who circulate those silly tales.

145. *Custom* or *habit* is a very extensive principle of association. Things and thoughts that have no other bond of union may, by appearing together, or being frequently joined together, become so closely related, that the one shall ever after introduce the other into the mind. Thus, in language written or spoken, the mind instantly passes from the word heard, or from the characters seen, to the thing signified; custom having so associated them that the one always reminds us of the other. Upon associations established by custom many of the pains and pleasures of life depend. An indifferent thing may become very agreeable, or very much the contrary, according to the nature of the ideas thus connected with it; and, in like manner in consequence of some perverse association, that which ought to make us serious may incline us to laughter.

146. Things solemn and sacred, therefore, should never be spoken of in terms of ridicule

or levity; and places appropriated to the offices of religion should never be made the scene of any thing ludicrous, trifling, or unsuitable. Where these rules are not attended to, important and frivolous thoughts may be so jumbled together in the mind, as that the former shall sometimes, very unseasonably and indecently, suggest the latter. Let sacred things be always accompanied with serious language and solemn circumstances: and let those who wish to retain the government of their passions and the command of their thoughts, be careful to check in the beginning every tendency to perverse and impure associations.

147. Dresses both ugly and inconvenient become fashionable; and custom reconciles us to the fashion, though at first, perhaps, it might appear ridiculous; which is also owing to associations founded in custom. For when we have long seen a particular form of dress worn by persons whom we love and esteem, and on occasions of the greatest festivity or solemnity, it acquires in our mind a connection with a great number of pleasing ideas; and whatever is so connected must itself be pleasing. It will appear by and by, that, from associations founded in habit, many, or perhaps most, of those pleasing emotions are derived, which accompany the

perception of that which in things visible is called *beauty*.

148. This subject will often come in our way hereafter. But before we leave it now, it may be proper to remark, that some people contract strange habits of what may be termed external association, of joining together two actions that have no natural connection, and appear very awkward when they are so joined. You may have seen a boy button and unbutton his coat all the while he is repeating his catechism; and we have heard of a lawyer, who could not go on with his pleading, unless he was continually winding a piece of packthread about his finger. It should be our care to guard against these and the like absurd habits, and to be very thankful to those who caution us against them; for the eyes of a friend are, in a matter of this kind, much more to be depended on than our own.

149. It was already observed, that the talent of invention applied to useful purposes is called *genius:* but it requires experience and good sense to enable one so to apply it. Every person is not a man of genius, nor is it necessary that he should. For in human society, as in an army, though there must be a few to contrive and command, far the greater number have nothing to do but to obey: and the efforts of the multitude are necessary to publick good, as well as

the contrivance of those who direct them. Besides, if every man were a man of genius, there would be so much ambition in the world, and so many projectors, and such a multiplicity of opposite interests, as would confound the order of human affairs. To the perfection of genius, learning and application are necessary, as well as natural talents. It is true, that some men of great genius have had little learning; but this was their misfortune: and it can hardly be doubted, that with a better education they would have made a better figure. Without industry and attention, genius is good for nothing.

150. Many are the degrees, and the varieties, of human genius. One man has a genius in mechanicks; another, in architecture; a third, in the conduct of military affairs; or in painting, geometry, musick, poetry, eloquence, &c.; and one man may make great progress, and contrive many improvements in one art, who could not have been so successful in another. And some men there are, of talents so universal, as to discover genius in every thing to which they apply themselves. It is not easy, nor perhaps possible, to account for these peculiarities and varieties of intellectual character. They may be partly owing to habits contracted in early years; and partly, and perhaps chiefly, to that particular constitution

of mind, by which, as well as by his face and other bodily peculiarities, one man is distinguished from another.

151. But, though we may be at a loss to explain the *efficient cause* of this variety, it is easy to see its *final cause*, that is, the intention of providence in appointing it. It is this that makes men take to different pursuits and employments; which renders them mutually useful to one another, and prevents too violent oppositions of interest. And hence mankind enjoy a variety of conveniencies; arts and sciences are invented and improved; and many sources are opened of commerce and friendly intercourse, whereby the circulation of truth is promoted, and the bounds of social virtue enlarged.

152. When one takes a view of the arts that flourish in society, one is apt to wonder at two things; first, their vast number and mutual subserviency; and, secondly, that men should be found who voluntarily make choice of one or other of all the employments necessary in civilized life. This consideration affords a proof of the extreme pliableness of the human mind, as well as of the goodness of providence. For, though some professions and trades are of low esteem, we find, that in every condition honest industry with contentment may be happy. Let

us therefore learn to set a proper value on all the useful arts of life, and on all those who practise them with integrity and industry.

153. The imagination is subject to certain disorders, which may be comprehended under the opposite extremes of levity and melancholy. Levity produces thoughtlessness, vanity, and contempt of others. Whatever therefore tends to make men considerate and humble may be proposed as a remedy for this disease, or rather as a means of preventing it. Habits of consideration may be acquired by studying history, geometry, and those parts of philosophy which lead to the observation of life and manners. Persons in danger from this disease should be kept at a distance from flattery and novels, and taught that honesty and attention to business are in every station respectable, and that contempt and misery never fail to attend a life of idleness or fantastick ambition. The company of those who are wiser and better than they, will also be of great and peculiar benefit to persons of this character: and some experience of adversity may be very serviceable in promoting that knowledge of one's self, and that fellow feeling for others, which repress vanity, by producing consideration and a lowly mind.

154. The practice of turning every thing into

joke and ridicule is a dangerous levity of imagination. Wit and humour, when natural, are very useful and very pleasing. But that studied and habitual jocularity, which I here speak of, and which some people affect, makes one a disagreeable and tiresome companion. It generally arises from vanity; it renders conversation unprofitable, and too often immoral; and it gradually perverts the understanding, both of those who practise it, and of those who take pleasure in hearing it. Our serious concerns demand our first attention: wit, humour, and merriment, may be used in the way of relaxation, but are not the business for which we were sent into this world.

155. An imagination disordered by melancholy is one of the greatest calamities incident to human nature. In order to prevent it, we ought by all means to avoid idleness, and lead an active life: to be temperate and social; to cherish every cheerful affection, as goodnature, good humour, patience, forgiveness, piety, humility, and benevolence, by all which the health of both the mind and body is effectually promoted; and to check the gloomy passions of anger, revenge, pride, suspicion, jealousy, misanthropy, excessive anxiety, and immoderate sorrow, which are all productive of misery and disease, both mental

and corporeal. They, who are in danger from a melancholy imagination, will do well to study nothing but what is amusing and practical; to abstain from tragical narratives, controversy, and lawsuits, which wear out the spirits to no purpose; to use moderation in study, as in every thing else; and to have recourse every day, more or less according to circumstances, to bodily exercise, innocent amusement, fresh air, and cheerful company. To guard against superstition and enthusiasm, by forming right notions of God's adorable nature and providence; and to avoid, as one would the pestilence, all books and all conversations that are likely to infuse impious, irreligious, or immoral opinions, is the duty, not of those only whose minds are oppressed with melancholy, but of all mankind without exception.

SECTION VIII.

Of Dreaming.

156. That may be very useful, of which we cannot discover the use: and dreams, though we know little of their nature, may yet be of great importance in our constitution. Most of the few unconnected remarks that follow are offered as

mere conjecture; for it would be vain to attempt to treat this subject in a scientifick manner. Most men dream, but all do not; and sometimes we dream more than at other times. In dreams we mistake ideas of imagination for real things. But when awake, and in our perfect mind, we never mistake a reality for a dream. Realities are perceived intuitively. We cannot prove by argument, that we are now awake; for we know of nothing more evident to prove it by: and it is essential to every proof to be clearer than that which is to be proved. But it is impossible for us to doubt of our being awake: such is the law of our nature. And our experience of the delusions of dreaming never affects, and is not supposed to affect, the certainty of human knowledge.

157. In good health we often dream of our ordinary business; which, however, is considerably disguised by imaginary circumstances. Such dreams partake of the nature of allegory: they resemble common life, and yet they differ from it. This the poets attend to; and, when they have occasion to describe any person's dream, they generally make it contain some shadowy representation of what is supposed to be in his mind when awake; and this we approve of, because we know it is natural. Disagreeable

dreams accompany certain bodily disorders; and when there is any tendency to fever in the human frame, they are very fatiguing and tiresome: whence a man of prudence, who is free from superstition, may make discoveries concerning his health, and learn from his dreams to live more temperately than usual, or take more or less exercise, or have recourse to other means, in order to avert the impending evil.

158. Dreams may sometimes be useful, as fables are, for conveying moral instruction. If, for example, we dream that we are in violent anger, and strike a blow which kills a man, the horrour we feel on the occasion may dispose us, when awake, to form resolutions against violent anger, lest it should at one time or other prompt us to a like perpetration. In the Tatler (No. 117) there is an account of a dream that conveys a sublime and instructive lesson of morality. Dreams are a striking instance of the activity of the human soul, and of its power of creating, as it were, without the help of the senses, ideas that give it amusement, and command its whole attention. Sometimes, however, in sleep, our memory, and sometimes our judgment, seem to have forsaken us: we believe the wildest absurdities, and forget the most remarkable events of our life. It is at least possible, that this tem-

porary suspension of our faculties may make the soul act more vigorously at other times, even as our bodily powers derive refreshment from rest.

159. Dreams may, in other respects, be friendly to our intellectual nature. To think too long, or too intensely, on any one subject, is hurtful to health, and sometimes even to reason. They may therefore be useful in giving variety to our thoughts, and forcing the mind to exert itself, for awhile, in a new direction. And persons who dream most frequently may, perhaps, from their constitution, have more need, than others have, of this sort of amusement; which is the more probable, because it is found, in fact, that those people are most apt to dream who are most addicted to intense thinking. In this view, even disagreeable dreams are useful: as a life of violent activity, of hardship, and even of danger, is recommended, and known to give relief, to persons oppressed with melancholy, and other mental disorders.

160. In ancient times, the dreams of some men were prophetical; but as we are not prophets, we have no reason to think that ours are of that sort. It may happen indeed, in the revolution of chances, that a dream shall resemble a future event. But this is rare; and, when it hap-

pens, not more wonderful, than that an irregular clock should now and then point at the right hour. Nor can it be admitted, that dreams are suggested by invisible beings; as they are for the most part mere trifles, and depend so much on the state of our mind and body. The soul in herself seems to possess vivacity sufficient to account for all the odd appearances that occur in sleep: for even when we are awake, and in health, very strange thoughts will sometimes arise in the mind. And, in certain diseases, waking thoughts are often as extravagant as the wildest dreams.

161. Our dreams are exceedingly various; but that they should be so, is not at all surprising. A very slight impression made on our organs of sense in sleep; a sound heard imperfectly; a greater or less degree of heat; our breathing in any respect interrupted, by the state of the stomach and bowels, by an awkward position of the head, or by external things affecting our organs of respiration; the temperature of the air in general, or that of our bed chamber in particular; these, and the like casualties, as well as the tenour of our thoughts through the day, the state of our health, and the passions that may happen to predominate in our mind, have all considerable influence in giving varie-

ty to our nocturnal imaginations. Uncommon dreams, therefore, should give us no concern. In these visionary appearances, uniformity would be more wonderful than the greatest variety. Some people, it is true, often find the same dream recur to them. Possibly this may be in part owing to habit; they dream the same thing a third or a fourth time, because they have talked or thought of it more than of other dreams. Hence, with respect to disagreeable dreams, we may learn a caution; which is, to banish them from our thoughts as soon as possible, and never speak of them at all. It is indeed a vulgar observation, but there is truth in it, that they who seldom talk of dreams are not often troubled with them.

SECTION IX.

Of some Secondary Sensations.

162. Of the *perceptive* powers of man there still remain to be considered, conscience, whereby we distinguish between vice and virtue; and reason, whereby we perceive the difference between truth and falsehood. These, to prevent unnecessary repetition, we pass by at present.

as they will come in our way hereafter, the former in moral philosophy, the latter in logick. If I had not wished to avoid troubling my hearers with too many divisions and subdivisions in the beginning, I would have divided sensation into primary and secondary. The former has been spoken of already. The latter I now enter upon; and, indeed, could hardly bring it in sooner; what has been said on the subject of imagination being necessary as an introduction to it. These secondary faculties of sensation have, by some writers, been called internal senses; by others, emotions. The name is of little importance: the nature of the thing will soon appear.

163. We perceive colours and figures by the eye; we also perceive that some colours and figures are *beautiful*, and others not. This power of perceiving beauty, which the brutes have not, though they *see* as well as we, I call a secondary sense. We perceive sounds by the ear; we also perceive, that certain combinations of sound have *harmony*, and that others are dissonant. This power of perceiving harmony, called in common language a musical ear, is another secondary sense, which the brutes have not, and of which many men who hear well enough are utterly destitute. Of these secondary senses there are, no doubt, many in the human consti-

tution. I confine myself to those of novelty, sublimity, beauty, imitation, harmony, and ridicule; which, together with sympathy, which I shall also describe, form what is commonly called *good taste*. The pleasures received by the secondary senses are, by Addison, in the sixth volume of the Spectator, and by Akenside, in the title of a poem which he wrote on the subject, termed *pleasures of imagination*.

164. Of novelty. Things in themselves indifferent, or even disagreeable, may be agreeable when new; and novelty in general has a charm in it, of which every rational, or every human being at least, is sensible. Hence our passion for variety, for amusement, for news, for strange sights, and for knowledge in general. The pleasure we take in new things arises from the active nature of man. We are never happy unless employed about something; and when we have nothing to do in the way of business or amusement, the mind becomes languid, and of course uneasy. Yet into this state we are apt to fall, when there is nothing to rouse our attention, or give play to our faculties. For when we have long been conversant about one set of objects, the mind comprehends them so easily, that they give it no exercise. In this case, a new object occurring gives an impulse

to the mind, and puts it upon exerting itself, and the exertion, if moderate, is agreeable. If the new object occasion surprise, or any other lively and pleasing emotion, its novelty will be still more interesting, because it will convey to the mind a more sprightly and perhaps a more permanent impulse.

165. Some things are more disagreeable at first, than they come to be afterwards; which may be owing to one or other of these two causes. Either the new object may have required, in order to its being comprehended, a violent and painful exertion of the faculties; as in the case of one entering upon a new study, or a new course of life: or we may have fixed our first attention on what seemed disagreeable in the new object; not discovering its agreeable qualities till we were better acquainted with it. Hence let us learn, that a good course of life, though somewhat unpleasant at first, ought not on that account to be relinquished; for we may be assured it will in time become pleasant, if persisted in. It is remarkable, that men sometimes contract a most violent liking to certain tastes that were at first extremely offensive, as those of tobacco and strong liquors. This depends on causes in which the mind has little concern. It may be, that, by the constant use of

such things, the stomach or the palate, and of course the animal spirits, are reduced to such a state as to be uneasy in the want of them. The part of prudence, therefore, is, to abstain from such things altogether, which requires no effort, rather than to hazard the acquisition of a habit which it may be almost impossible to overcome. Unnatural pleasures of this sort it is no evil to be without, but it may be a fatal evil to acquire a relish for.

166. In all the arts that minister to rational pleasure, variety is studied, that the mind may be refreshed with a succession of novelties. The prose writer, where it can be done conveniently, varies the length, the sound, and the syntax, of contiguous clauses and sentences; and amuses the reader's fancy with metaphors, similitudes, and other apposite figures of speech. The poet varies the structure of contiguous verses; and, in framing his fable, is careful to bring in events that are both probable and unexpected, and persons who differ from each other in character, appearance, and adventures. So in the other fine arts. In the works of nature there is great uniformity, and at the same time the most unbounded variety: so that he who studies them is continually delighted with new and wonderful discoveries; and yet is never perplexed by their

multiplicity, because order, proportion, and fitness, prevail through the whole system.

167. The taste for novelty is an important part of the human constitution. It is the source of much amusement, and prompts men to labour in the acquisition of knowledge. It is, besides, one of our first passions. You cannot gratify a child more, than by showing him something new, or telling him a wonderful story. The same novelties are not equally captivating to all. Some seek after new attainments in science; some wander through the world to visit different nations; some explore the wonders of inanimate nature, and some the characters of men; some read history, some study the fine arts, some are curious in whatever relates to mechanism, and some mind little more than the news of the day; some amuse themselves with collecting pictures, prints, manuscripts, medals, shells, minerals; and some are fond of old, and others of new books. Thus men take to different pursuits and employments, and every part of knowledge is cultivated.

168. Of sublimity. Things of great magnitude, as a large building, a high mountain, a broad river, a wide prospect, the ocean, the sky, &c. fill the mind of the beholder with admiration and pleasing astonishment, and with

respect to this sensation are called sublime. Great height and depth, and great number too, as an army, a navy, a long succession of years, eternity, &c. are sublime objects, because they fill our minds with the same pleasing astonishment. In contemplating such things, we are conscious of something like an expansion or elevation of our faculties, as if we were exerting our whole capacity to comprehend the vastness of the object.

169. Whatever it be that raises in us this pleasurable astonishment, is accounted sublime, whether connected with quantity or number, or not. Hence loud sounds, like those of thunder, cannon, a full organ, a storm; hence those fictions in poetry, that produce an imaginary, and not painful terrour; hence any uncommon degree of virtue, of genius, or even of bodily strength; and hence those affections which elevate the soul, as fortitude, devotion, and universal benevolence, or which are, in their objects, causes, or effects, connected with great number or great quantity; are all denominated sublime, and fill our minds with the same delightful astonishment and admiration.

170. The Deity;—the source of happiness and the standard of perfection; who creates, preserves, pervades, and governs all things; whose

power is omnipotent, whose wisdom is perfect, whose goodness is unbounded, whose greatness is incomprehensible; who was from all eternity, and of whose dominion there can be no end: he is undoubtedly, and, beyond all comparison, the most sublime object which it is possible to conceive or to contemplate: and of all created sublimity (if I may so speak) his works exhibit the most perfect and most astonishing examples. There are, no doubt, sublime operations of human art, as ships of war, cathedral churches, palaces, mounds for repelling the sea, &c. But, in respect of greatness, these are nothing, when we compare them with mountains, volcanoes, the ocean, the expanse of heaven, clouds and storms, thunder and lightning, the sun and moon, the solar system, the universe.

171. Poetry, painting, and musick, are called fine arts; because, though not necessary to life, they are highly ornamental. Architecture is also a fine art; for it improves building to a degree far beyond what is necessary. And by each of these arts the sublime is attainable. That is sublime musick which inspires sublime affections, as courage and devotion; or which, by its sonorous harmonies, overwhelms the mind with a pleasing astonishment. Architecture is sublime, when it is large, lofty, and durable; and, at

the same time, so simple and well proportioned as that the eye can take in all its greatness at once. For a number of little parts and ornaments take away from the sublimity of a great building, though they may sometimes add to its beauty. Painting is sublime, when it exhibits men invested with great qualities, such as bodily strength; or actuated by sublime passions, as devotion or valour; or when it successfully imitates great visible objects, artificial or natural, as mountains, precipices, palaces, storms, cataracts, volcanoes, and the like.

172. Poetry is sublime; first, when it elevates the mind, and makes it, as it were, superiour to the cares and troubles of this world: secondly, when it infuses any sublime affection, as devotion, valour, universal benevolence, the love of virtue and of our country: thirdly, when it affects the mind with an awful and imaginary, but not unpleasing horrour: fourthly, when it describes the sentiments or actions of those persons whose character is sublime: and fifthly, when it conveys a lively idea of any grand appearance, natural, artificial, or imaginary. That style is sublime, which makes us readily conceive any great object or sentiment in a lively manner; and this is often done when the words are very plain and simple.

173. It is true, that poets and orators, when they describe sublime objects, do often elevate their style with tropes and figures, and high sounding expressions. And this is suitable to the nature of human speech: for, when we speak of any thing which we consider as great, it is natural for us, even in common discourse, to raise our voice, and pronounce with more than usual solemnity. But in the use of bold figures and sonorous language great caution is requisite: for, if they be too frequent, or seem to be too much sought after, or if they be not accompanied with a correspondent elevation of thought, they become ridiculous, and are called bombast, or false sublime. Even in brutes there may be qualities which command our admiration and astonishment: whence lions, horses, and elephants, are sublime objects; not so much because their bodies are large, though this may have some effect, as on account of their uncommon strength, sagacity, or contempt of danger.

174. Though real greatness always raises admiration, littleness does not always excite the contrary passion of contempt. That which is little may be beautiful or useful, or ingeniously contrived, and so give pleasure in various ways, and sometimes raise admiration too; for who does not admire the beauty of a rose, and the

wonderful instincts of the bee? Littleness is then offensive, and is called meanness, when we are disappointed by it, and meet with it in a place, where we had reason to expect something better. There is a meanness in certain words and phrases, which for that reason ought to be avoided on every solemn occasion, and in all elegant writing. Important sentiments expressed in mean words, raise indignation or laughter. Think what effect a sermon would have, if it were mixed with vulgar proverbs, or broad Scotch words. Now those are mean words, which are not used except by illiterate or by affected persons, or on very familiar occasions. Common proverbs, customary forms of compliment, ungrammatical expressions, cant phrases and provincial barbarisms, have all more or less of this meanness; and, however they may pass on common occasions, or when people mean to talk ludicrously, will always give great offence in compositions that aim at sublimity or elegance. But of this more hereafter.

175. The contemplation of the divine nature, and of the works of creation and providence, will no doubt constitute our supreme and final felicity. To prepare us for such contemplation, and raise our minds above the present world, the Deity has been pleased to endow us with a capacity of receiving pleasure, even in this life,

from the view of what is good or eminently great. Our taste for the sublime, cherished into a habit, and directed to proper objects, may therefore promote our moral improvement, by leading us to contemplate the Creator in his wonderful works; by keeping us at a distance from vice, which is the vilest of all things; and by recommending virtue for its intrinsick dignity and loveliness.

176. Of BEAUTY. This term is applied to many sorts of agreeable things: we speak of beautiful language, and of a beautiful song, as well as of a beautiful face. At present I speak of visible beauty chiefly; which may belong, first to *colour*, secondly to *figure*, thirdly to *attitude* or *gesture*, and fourthly to *motion*. In general it may be observed, that the pleasure we take in looking at what is beautiful, a rose for example, is very different in kind from the pleasure that attends the contemplation of a sublime object, as a great cataract, or a huge and craggy mountain. The latter sensation (if it may be so called) seems to rouse and elevate the mind, the former to compose it: the one is solemn and serious; the other has a mixture of gladness in it, which disposes the face of the beholder to a smile. Beauty and greatness may be united in the same object, in which case they mutually adorn each other. The rainbow in its colours and circular

form is extremely beautiful, and at the same time very sublime, on account of its apparent magnitude and elevation.

177. Colours are beautiful, first, when they convey to the mind a lively sensation, as white and red; secondly, when they cherish the organ of sight, as green; thirdly, when they have that character which we term delicacy, and yield a sensation both lively and gentle, as pale red, and light blue. But, fourthly, the beauty of a colour depends chiefly on the agreeableness of the ideas it conveys to the mind; for the same colour which in one thing is very beautiful, may in another be very ugly. The verdure of the fields, for example, is delightful, because it leads us to think of fruitfulness, fragrance, and many other pleasant things; but greenness in the human face would be horrible, because it would suggest the notion of pain, of disease, or of something unnatural.

178. Colours that look as if they were stained or sullied, or which are so indefinite that one knows not what name to give them, are not often considered as beautiful. But those gradations of colour, which we see in flowers, in the plumage of some birds, in the rainbow, in the evening and morning sky, and in many other natural appearances, are beautiful in the highest degree; when the colours so melt away into one

another, that, though we discern the change, we cannot mark where the one ends and the other begins. The delicacy wherewith they are blended so far surpasses the ordinary efforts of human skill, that we cannot behold it without admiration. In general, every colour is beautiful, that brings along with it the agreeable idea of perfection, of health, of convenience, of intellectual or moral virtue, or of any other sort of excellence. Negroes love their own colour for the same reason that we love ours; because they always see it; because all the people they love have it; and because none are without it but those who are thought to be strangers and enemies. This, at least, must be the negro's way of thinking, as long as he remains in his own country, or till he have the singular good fortune to find friends among white people. So much for beauty of colour.

179. Perfection and skill are always agreeable; and whatever suggests them to the mind must be so too, and, if visible, is entitled to be called beautiful. For this reason it seems to be, that figures so well proportioned and so complete, as circles, squares, ellipses, hexagons, &c. convey to us the notion of beauty. Want of proportion in figures is not agreeable, and therefore not beautiful, because it makes us think of inconve-

nience, unskilfulness, or imperfection. Figures, as they appear in furniture, in architecture, or in any other work of art, are more or less beautiful, according as they convey to us, more or less, the idea of skill, convenience, and usefulness. In fact, the beauty of things depends very much, as Socrates rightly thought, upon their utility: for if a thing be useless, we cannot like it; if we do not like it, it will give us no pleasure; and of all beauty it is the character, to be pleasing. Were the horse as slow as the snail, we should be more inclined to dislike his unwieldy size, than to admire his fine shape.

180. That form of the human body is accounted beautiful, which conveys the idea of bodily perfection. Now the human body is in its most perfect state in youth; and therefore, in respect of *shape*, a youthful body is more elegant than that of an infant or old man. Another reason may be given for this, as follows: in all beautiful animals, and in all the most beautiful parts of animals, the figure is bounded rather by curves, than by straight lines; except where these last may be necessary, as in the legs of animals, to strength and convenience. If the back and the breast of a fine horse were bounded by right lines, instead of that flowing curve which winds so gracefully about them, every one must be

sensible, that the beauty of the shape would be lost. Now, in the outlines of the body of an infant, the curves are rather too much bent, on account of the redundancy of flesh compared with the smallness of the size; in the body of an old man they are too little bent, and approach to right lines, on account of the decay of moisture: in youth they are neither too much bent nor too little, but a middle between both; and then the *shape* of the body is most perfect.

181. In the works of nature, the greatest usefulness is often united with perfect beauty of colour and figure: and the more we study them, the more beautiful they appear; because we become the more sensible of their utility, as well as better acquainted with their form. In them too, that which we call beauty is generally smooth, or seems to be so; and is rather small than great, that is, rather below the usual proportion than above it. A craggy mountain is a sublime object, and its crags may add to its sublimity; but a beautiful hill is, or appears to be, smooth. The statue of Minerva may be tall, dignity being her character; but a gigantick Venus would be absurd. So much for beauty of *shape* or *figure*.

182. Those gestures are graceful, which show the body to advantage; or which are assumed

with ease, and may continue a considerable time without giving pain; or which are suitable to the nature of the person or animal, and to the passion or sentiment that is supposed to be in the person's mind, provided that passion or sentiment be such as we approve. And no gesture is graceful, which conveys any disagreeable idea of unwieldiness, infirmity, constraint, affectation, or any evil passion.

183. The same remarks may be made on beauty of motion. Those motions in general are graceful, which are performed with ease; which imply bodily perfection; and which are naturally expressive of agreeable passions or sentiments in the mind of the person who moves. The motion of some inanimate things is very beautiful; as that of smoke ascending slowly in the sky, of unbroken waves in the sea, and of flags and streamers flying in the wind. The first pleases, as an emblem of tranquillity; the second, on account of the smoothness, greatness, and uniformity; and the last, by the glare of colours, by the easy curvature, and by suggesting agreeable ideas of busy life. The characteristicks of beauty, according to some authors, are uniformity, variety, and proportion. How far each of these may be necessary to form beauty, and why each

of them gives pleasure, will perhaps appear from what has been said.

184. That which in the smallest compass exhibits the greatest variety of beauty, is a fine human face. The features are of *various* sizes and forms; the corresponding ones exactly *uniform;* and each has that shape, size, position, and *proportion*, which is most *convenient*. Here too is the greatest beauty of *colours*, which are blended, varied, and disposed, with marvellous *delicacy*. But the chief beauty of the countenance arises from its expression, of sagacity, goodnature, cheerfulness, modesty, and other moral and intellectual virtues. Without such expression, no face can be truly beautiful; and with it, none can be really ugly. Human beauty, therefore, at least that of the face, is not merely a corporeal quality; but derives its origin and essential characters from the soul: and almost any person may, in some degree, acquire it, who is at pains to improve his understanding, to repress criminal thoughts, and to cherish good affections; as every one must lose it, whatever features or complexion there may be to boast of, who leaves the mind uncultivated, or a prey to evil passions, or a slave to trifling pursuits.

185. Of Imitation. Man is of all animals the most prone to imitation, and takes great delight

in it. By imitating others, we learn to speak and walk, and do many other things, long before we could either attend to rules, or understand them. Many of the sports of children are imitations of the actions of men: and we find, that, in most nations, dramatick performances, which are also imitations of what happens in real life, are much attended to, and greatly esteemed as an amusement.

186. We receive pleasure from seeing a good imitation, though the original be indifferent, or, perhaps, even disagreeable. A common plant we view with indifference, and a dead man we could not see without pain; but a good picture of either would give pleasure: and a picture, equally good, of a beautiful object, would please still more. And this pleasure arises chiefly from our admiration of the skill displayed in the work: for admiration is an agreeable emotion; and it gratifies a sound mind to see any thing perfect, or advancing to perfection.

187. Poetry, painting, and musick, are called *fine arts*, for a reason formerly given. They are also called *imitative arts;* because in them the appearances or operations of nature are, or are supposed to be, imitated; in painting, by colour; in poetry, by language; and in musick, by sound. The contemplation of nature is delightful to the

human soul; and nothing that is unnatural, or contrary to nature, can please a well informed mind. And, therefore, the fine arts, being all intended to give pleasure, must exhibit either what is according to nature, or what is similar to it; either what is real, or what is likely and probable.

188. That pictures are imitations of nature, is obvious; and in them may be imitated almost every thing visible, not only animals and inanimate things, but also the passions and emotions of the mind; for these last produce visible appearances in the look and gesture, by which they are known, and which a painter may delineate. But, as no more than the events of one instant can be seen at one instant, and as the whole picture strikes the eye at once, the subject of every painting must be *one* event or appearance, or must at least be such a combination of appearances, as may be supposed to be contiguous in place, and to be seen at one and the same time. The progress, therefore, of action, or of thought, painting cannot imitate. However, by exhibiting visible things in those attitudes, in which they are never seen except when they move, it may give a very lively idea of certain kinds of motion; as of rolling billows, ascending smoke, trees waving in the wind, fluttering

robes and streamers, and animal bodies running, walking, swimming, or flying. Those thoughts that produce no visible change in the appearance of the body, cannot be expressed in a picture.

189. Language, the instrument of poetical imitation, is applicable to all subjects, and may with the greatest accuracy imitate and describe human actions, passions, and sentiments, in each period of their progress, as well as every appearance in the animal or inanimate world. It has been doubted, whether poetry be an *imitation*, or a *representation*, of nature. The controversy is of little moment, and may perhaps be thus determined. If we consider it as an art, that exhibits not what is real, but only what is likely or probable, we must call poetry imitative; because there is something in it which is not in nature: for it is essential to an *imitation* to be in some respect or other different from the original. Ideas conveyed to the fancy by good poetical description would, if delineated by the painter, and made visible by means of colour, be found to resemble natural things; and if such a picture be an imitation, the description whence it is copied must be so to. *Real* things may indeed be *truly* described in poetical numbers; but this is not common; nor would this be any thing else than history in verse: it being the

business of the poet (as will be shown hereafter) to represent things not as they are, but rather as they might be. This reasoning refers chiefly to narrative and descriptive poems. In dramatick poetry, the imitation of human action is obvious and unquestionable. Whether musick be imitative, will be seen by and by. Architecture is an useful and noble art, but cannot be called imitative. Only the pillars in old cathedral churches are said to have been framed in imitation of rows of trees, to which indeed they bear a great similitude; the people who invented this mode of building having, it seems, annexed some notion of sanctity to that appearance; probably because men had been accustomed, before the use of temples, to perform the rites of their religion under the shade of trees in a grove.

190. So great is the pleasure we receive from seeing nature well imitated, that the representation of human misfortunes upon the stage, or in poems, gives delight, even while it infuses the painful passions of pity and sorrow. This is owing, partly to the agitation produced in the mind of the reader or spectator by the circumstances of the story; partly, to the art displayed in the representation by the player, or by the poet in the narrative; partly, to our being conscious, that what we read or see is not real, but

imaginary, distress (for to those children who mistake it for real, it is found to give pain instead of amusement); and partly, and perhaps chiefly, to the nature of pity, which, though a painful passion, is in the exercise accompanied with several gratifications; such as our consciousness of its being praiseworthy in itself, ornamental to our nature, useful in society, and amiable in the eyes of our brethren of mankind.

191. Of Harmony. That the sense of harmony, commonly called a musical ear, is a distinct faculty from the sense of hearing, appears from this; that many men receive no pleasure from musick who hear very well, and that some who are dull of hearing are very fond of musick: and other facts might be mentioned that prove the same thing. Observe, that, in the language of art, harmony and melody are distinguished; the latter being the agreeable effect of a single series of musical tones; and the former, the agreeable effect produced by two or more series of musical tones sounded at the same time. Observe further, that melody gives pleasure to all who have a musical ear, our taste for it being natural, though very capable of improvement; whereas harmony is little relished, except by those who have studied it, or have been much accustomed to hear it. Yet harmony is in some

degree pleasing to most people; its essential laws being so well founded in nature, that nobody who understands them questions their propriety.

192. Musick consists of sound and motion. The peculiar motion of any piece of musick is called its rhythm or number, or, in common language, its time. When a tune is accompanied with the drum, or with a dance, we hear the rhythm in the sound of the feet, or of the drumsticks. Rhythm belongs also to verse, and even to prose: for the pauses and the continuity of pronunciation, and the interchange of short and long, or of emphatick and nonemphatick, syllables, may all be imitated by the drum, or by the hand striking on a board. Do not confound *rhythm* with *rhyme*. Rhythm is a Greek word, and means what has been just now said. Rhyme is a modern word, and in English denotes the similar sounds that terminate contiguous verses in certain sorts of poetry.

193. By its sounds musick may imitate sounds; and by its motion, motions. But irregular motions, or inharmonious sounds, it cannot imitate; because every thing in this art must be regular and harmonious. Its imitative powers, therefore, are very limited. And musick may be strictly imitative, and yet intolerably bad; or not at all imitative, and yet perfectly good. The imitation of

nature is, therefore, not essential to this art, as it is to poetry and painting. Consequently musick pleases, not because it imitates nature, but for some other reasons which may be explained as follows.

194. First: some sounds, especially when continued, are pleasing in themselves, though they have neither meaning nor modulation: such is the murmur of groves, winds, and waters. Musical sounds, even when heard separate, are all pleasing in themselves, or ought to be so; and the more they resemble the tones of a good human voice, the more pleasing they are, and the more perfect. Secondly: some tones, sounded at the same time, have an agreeable, and others a disagreeable effect: the former are called concords, the latter discords. All concords are not equally agreeable, nor all discords equally harsh; and the art of harmony lies in blending the harsher with the sweeter concords, or even with discords, in such a manner as most effectually to please the ear. The artful management of this matter is another source of the pleasure we derive from musick.

195. Thirdly: in all regular musick, variety and proportion are united, and have a pleasing effect upon the mind, similar to that which they have in things visible: that is, they gently exercise

the faculties without bewildering or fatiguing them, and they suggest the agreeable ideas of contrivance and skill. But in what manner variety and proportion enter into the composition of musick, can be explained to those only, who know something both of the practice and of the theory of the art. One artifice however may be mentioned, which the most unskilful may understand. Some pieces of musick are contrived with the express purpose of introducing apparent confusion; as fugues, in which different instruments, or voices, take up the same air, but not all at the same time, so that one is, as it were, the echo of the other; and yet the general result is not confusion, which one would expect, but perfect harmony: which gives an agreeable surprise, and heightens our admiration of the author's skill, and of the dexterity of the performers.

196. Fourthly: musick is agreeable, which infuses into the mind, or prepares it for being affected with, agreeable passions. Now, as all the rules of the art tend to give pleasure, all the passions it can raise must be of the agreeable kind. It may dispose the soul to devotion, gladness, courage, compassion, or benevolence; but has no expression for impiety, cowardice, anger, envy, or malice. The meaning, however, or expression of musick is not determinate, unless it be united

with poetry, or language: so that the most perfect musick is *song;* in which elegant words, distinctly pronounced, give significancy to melody well modulated by the voice, and enforced by suitable harmonies. And therefore, musick merely instrumental is to a certain degree imperfect; unless we are led by custom, or by some outward circumstance, to assign it a definite meaning.

197. Fifthly: all musick is agreeable, which conveys agreeable thoughts to the mind of the hearer. We have heard it formerly in an agreeable place perhaps, or performed by an agreeable person, or accompanied with agreeable words, or some other pleasing circumstance. Hence, when we hear it again, we hear it with pleasure, because it suggests some pleasing recollection, or some idea at least of former happiness. From this principle, a great deal of the pleasure may be accounted for, which we derive from musick, especially from that of our own country.

198. That the sense of harmony is no unimportant part of the human constitution, will appear, when we consider, that in all civilized, and many unpolished nations, musick has ever been accounted agreeable as an amusement, and useful as a means of inspiring courage, devotion, gladness, and other good affections. Polybius, a grave and wise historian, ascribes the humanity of the

ancient Arcadians to their knowledge of this art, and the barbarity of their neighbours the Cynethians to their neglect of it. And as he was a native of Arcadia, we can hardly suppose that a man of his penetration could be mistaken in a matter of this kind.

199. Of Laughter. To perceive an object, and to laugh at it, are different things: brutes perceive, but never laugh. Risibility is one of the distinguishing characters of man. Some things excite laughter mixed with contempt or disapprobation; as the absurdities of a lying traveller, a boastful soldier, or a great miser: such things are properly termed *ridiculous*. Other things, which provoke laughter merely, without contempt or disapprobation may be called *ludicrous*. Such are the tricks of monkies and young cats: and such, though in all other respects totally different, are those examples of wit and humour, which we laugh at in books or persons whom we admire and esteem. Here we are to consider ludicrous objects chiefly; as laughter, and not contempt, is the object of the present inquiry.

200. Laughter may be occasioned by tickling, or in children by gladness. But I speak of that laughter, which is the outward expression of a certain agreeable emotion raised in the mind by the view, or by the conception, of something which

we call oddity, drollery, or by some such name. This feeling may be in the mind, when laughter, the outward sign, does not appear; for one may restrain laughter, when one is much tempted to indulge it. In like manner, tears are an outward sign of sorrow, but one may be very sorrowful who does not weep. What then is this drollery, or oddity? what is that quality or character, which all ludicrous or laughable objects have in common?

201. First: The object of ridicule in comedy is very well defined by Aristotle; who calls it, some small fault or turpitude, not attended with pain, and not destructive: for to laugh at distress, or at great faults, is at once unnatural and wicked; and therefore a writer of comedy is highly blamable, when he introduces misfortunes or crimes on the stage, in order to make us laugh at them. But Aristotle's definition does not hold true of laughter in general, or even of all innocent laughter: for men may laugh innocently at that in which they perceive no turpitude. Fine turns of wit and humour may be ludicrous, even when they suggest to the mind nothing which it is possible either to despise or to disapprove.

202. Secondly: Mr. Hobbes is of opinion, and he is rashly followed by the author of the forty-seventh paper of the Spectator, that laughter is a

sudden exultation of mind, arising from the conception of preeminence in ourselves, and of inferiority in that which we compare with ourselves as we are at present. This resolves laughter into pride. But nothing is more absurd. Proud men are more remarkable for gravity than for laughter; and laughter is seldom taken for a sign of pride. And men laugh at things which they do not compare with themselves at all; and at the wit and humour of authors, whom they believe to be their superiours in every respect.

203. Thirdly: Hutcheson says, that a mixture of dignity and meanness, appearing in the same object, or suggested to the mind by one and the same appearance, is the cause of laughter. And indeed it often is, but not always. For such a mixture appears in the people, and in the houses, of every large town; and yet a large town, or a great multitude, is rather a sublime than a ludicrous object. And laughter may be raised by some sorts of wit and humour, in which it is impossible to discern any mixture of dignity and meanness. And a mimick may make us laugh, by imitating the manner of a person who has no more dignity than the mimick himself has. These theories, therefore, are either false, or not sufficiently comprehensive.

204. If a painter, says Horace, were to join to

the head of a man the neck of a horse, feathers of different birds, limbs of different animals, and the tail of a fish, the whole would be ludicrous. This, it seems, was true in Horace's time, and no doubt is so still. It would appear then, that a ludicrous object must be made up of several parts; that the parts whereof it is made up must be in some degree inconsistent, unsuitable, or incongruous; and that they must be considered as united in one assemblage, or as acquiring a sort of mutual connection from the peculiar manner in which the mind takes notice of them; and therefore it may be inferred, that laughter is occasioned by an incongruity or unsuitableness of the parts that compose, or seem to compose, any complex object or idea. Incongruous objects may in several ways be united so as to make the union ludicrous.

205. First: When they happen to be *placed together*. Erasmus, in a dialogue called *absurda*, endeavours to provoke mirth by a conference between two persons, who speak alternately, each pursuing a subject of his own, without any regard to what is said by the other. It looks like a dialogue between two deaf men: and the humour, such as it is, if there be any, arises merely from the juxtaposition of sentences, which have no other relation but that of place. When Pope says of prince Eugene, that "he is a great taker of

"snuff as well as of towns," the two things spoken of, which are utterly incongruous, acquire an unexpected relation by being placed together, and made equally dependent on the word *taker;* which of course becomes a *pun*, by being used at one and the same time in two different senses. And it is this mixture, of incongruity and seeming relation, that makes the passage ludicrous.

206. Secondly: When things appearing in the relation of *cause and effect* are very incongruous and inadequate to each other, they sometimes provoke a smile; as when a man is thrown into a violent passion by a trifling cause; as if we were to see a person seriously attempt (like the child in Quarles's emblems) to blow out the sun with a pair of bellows, or four men take hold of the four corners of a church with an intention to lift it from the ground.

207. Thirdly: The unexpected discovery of *resemblance* between things supposed to be unlike, when it is clearly expressed in few words, constitutes what is commonly called *wit;* and is a very copious source of pleasantry. Such, to give one instance, is that comparison in Hudibras, of the dawn of the morning to a boiled lobster; "like a "lobster boil'd the morn from black to red began "to turn." At first, there seems to be no resemblance at all: but, when we recollect, that the

lobster's colour is by boiling changed from dark to red, we recognise a likeness to that change of colour in the sky which happens at day-break.

208. Fourthly: *Dignity and meanness* unexpectedly united, or supposed to be united, in the same assemblage, is a frequent cause of laughter. As when a mean sentiment unexpectedly appears in a solemn discourse, or a serious sentiment in a trifling one: as when the phraseology of a solemn passage in a well known author is, by a little change of words, made to express, in the way of parody, something frivolous or very different: as when mean ideas and images are expressed in pompous language, as in the Dunciad and Splendid Shilling: as when important ideas are debased by mean words or provincial barbarisms, whereof we have had some examples already. (See § 174.) But observe, that mixtures of this sort, when they seem to proceed from want of taste, or from any mental depravity, are more apt to move indignation than laughter.

209. In ludicrous writing two sorts of style are used, and both imply a mixture of dignity and meanness; namely, the mock heroick and the burlesque. The former considers little things as great, and describes them with pomp of language and of harmony. The Dunciad, the Splendid Shilling, the Battle of the frogs and mice, com-

monly, though erroneously, ascribed to Homer, are masterpieces in this way of writing; as are also the Lutrin of Boileau, and Pope's Rape of the Lock. The burlesque author assumes the character of a buffoon, and considers great things as little, and little things as less than the reality; and affects vulgar language, and, if he write in verse, a peculiar levity in the construction of his numbers. Hudibras, and the History of John Bull, are in the burlesque style; the one verse, the other prose, and both excellent in their kind.

210. Some works of humour are written in a grave style, without either meanness or elevation of language. Many of the humorous papers in the Tatler and Spectator, and many passages in Gulliver's Travels, are of this sort. The author takes the character of a plain man delivering a simple and serious narrative of a matter which he seems to think important and true; and this, if the subject be trifling, or the narrative palpably fabulous, has the same pleasing effect, as when a person tells a merry story with an unaffected gravity of countenance. See particularly the journal of the court of honour in the Tatler.

211. Incongruity is not always ludicrous. It ceases to be so, when it comes to be customary and common; and, therefore, ludicrous incongruity must have in it something uncommon, or, at

least, unexpected. New fashions of dress often seem at their first appearance ridiculous; but, when generally adopted, are ridiculous no longer. Besides, the inward emotion that prompts to laughter is not very powerful; many other emotions have naturally more strength, and have therefore a natural right to suppress it. Consequently, those incongruous associations, that give rise to pity, disgust, fear, anger, hatred, or moral disapprobation, are not laughable; because they call forth passions of greater power, and more importance. In these cases the weaker emotion gives place to the stronger.

212. And every one is sensible that it ought to be so. Were a man to laugh at distress, or at any thing which his conscience tells him is criminal, he would be severely censured; for it would be said, with respect to the first, that he ought to pity, and not to laugh; and, with respect to the second, that superiour considerations ought to have restrained his laughter; for that they are fools who laugh at sin. And most people must have observed, that we are not apt to laugh at that which disgusts us, or makes us very angry, or seriously afraid. Had the writers of comedy paid a proper regard to these things, and never attempted to call forth either immoral or unnatural laughter, the comick muse would, in respect,

both of utility and of elegance, have been more worthy of honour, than I am afraid she can be said to be in any nation.

213. Laughter, notwithstanding what lord Chesterfield has said against it, is perfectly consistent with elegant manners; as might be proved from the practice of some of the most distinguished characters both of these and of former times. Goodbreeding, however, lays some restraints upon it, which may be thus explained. Goodbreeding is the art, or rather the habit, of pleasing those with whom we converse. Now we cannot please others, if we either show them what is unpleasing in ourselves, or give them reason to think that we perceive unpleasing qualities in them. All emotions, therefore, which may betray our own bad qualities, or might naturally arise from the view of bad qualities in others; and all those emotions or passions in general, which our company may think too violent, and cannot sympathize with or partake in, goodbreeding requires that we suppress. Laughter that is too loud, or too frequent, is an emotion of this kind. And, therefore, a well bred man will be careful not to laugh louder or longer than others; nor to laugh at all, when he has reason to think, that the jest will not be equally relished by the company.

214. This rule, a little extended, may be of great use for the regulation of all those emotions that display themselves in the outward behaviour. Truth we should never violate, nor offer any outrage to virtue or decency. But, within the bounds of innocence, it is both our duty and our interest, to make ourselves agreeable to those with whom we associate, especially to the wise and good. This, however, we shall not be able to do, unless we take pains to regulate all our passions, and bring them down to that level, on which they will be agreeable to the more intelligent part of mankind. The suppression of evil passions, even for a short time, weakens their force, and will at last, if persisted in, give us the victory over them. And hence, in regular society, where the rules of goodbreeding are observed, and where inordinate passions are not suffered to appear outwardly in the behaviour, we live together on a more agreeable footing, and in a way more favourable to virtuous improvement, than in any of those states of society, in which men are at no pains to conceal or govern their passions. The savage is impetuous, and a slave to sudden and violent passion; in the man of breeding we expect coolness, moderation, and selfcommand.

215. The emotions connected with risibility are a source of much amusement to persons of

every age and condition. Wit and humour, when innocent, as they always may be and ought to be, enliven conversation, and endear human creatures to one another; and, when discreetly applied, may be of singular advantage in discountenancing vice and folly.

SECTION X.

Of Sympathy.

216. There is in our nature a tendency to participate in the pains and pleasures of others; so that their good is in some degree our good, and their evil our evil: the natural effect of which is, to unite men more closely to one another, by prompting them, even for their own sake, to relieve distress and promote happiness. This participation of the joys and sorrows of others may be termed sympathy, or fellow feeling. Sympathy with distress is called compassion, or pity. Sympathy with the happiness of another has no particular name; but, when expressed in words to the happy person, is termed congratulation. Every good man knows, that it is natural for him to rejoice with them who rejoice, and to weep with those that weep.

217. Even for some inanimate things we have a sort of tenderness, which, by a licentious figure of speech, might be called sympathy. To lose a staff which we have long walked with, or see in ruins a house where we had long lived happily, would give a slight concern, though the loss to us were a trifle, or nothing at all. We feel something like pity for the dead bodies of our friends, arising from the consideration of their being laid in the solitary grave, a prey to worms and reptiles; and yet we are sure that from that circumstance the dead can never suffer any thing. Towards the brute creation, who have feeling as well as we, though not in the same degree or kind, our sympathy is more rational, and indeed ought to be strong: "a righteous man regardeth "the life," and is not insensible to the happiness, "of his beast."

218. But our sympathy operates most powerfully towards our fellow men; and, other circumstances being equal, is for the most part more or less powerful, according as they are more nearly, or more remotely, connected with us by kindred, by friendship, or by condition. With a friend, with a relation, or with a person of our own condition, we are more apt to sympathize, than with people of different circumstances or connections. If we were to be tried for our life, we should wish

to have a jury of our equals. He who has had the toothach or the gout, is more inclined to pity those who suffer from the same distempers, than that person is who never felt them.

219. We sometimes sympathize with another person in a case in which that person has little feeling of either good or evil. We blush at the rudeness of another man in company, even when he himself does not know that he is rude. We tremble for a mason standing on a high scaffold, though we have reason to believe he is in no danger, because custom has made it familiar to him. On these occasions, our fellow feeling seems to arise, not from our opinion of what the other person suffers, but from our idea of what we ourselves should suffer if we were in his situation, with the same habits and powers of reflection which we have at present.

220. Our fellow feeling is never thoroughly roused, till we know something of the nature and cause of that happiness or misery which is the occasion of it: for till this be known, we cannot so easily imagine ourselves in the condition of the happy or unhappy person. When we meet with one in distress, where the cause is not apparent, we are uneasy indeed, but the pain is not so great, or at least not so definite, as it comes to be when he has answered this question; what is the matter

with you? which is always the first question we ask on such occasions. And then our sympathy is in proportion to what we think he feels, or perhaps to what we may think it reasonable that he should feel.

221. Many of our passions may be communicated or strengthened by sympathy. In a cheerful company we become cheerful, and melancholy in a sad one. The presence of a multitude employed in devotion tends to make us devout; the timorous have acted valiantly in the society of the valiant; and the cowardice of a few has struck a panick into an army. In a historical or fabulous narrative, we sympathize with our favourite personages in those emotions of gratitude, joy, indignation, or sorrow, which we suppose would naturally arise in them from the circumstances of their fortune. Passions, however, that are natural, as envy, jealousy, avarice, malice; or unreasonably violent, as rage and revenge, we are not apt to sympathize with; we rather take part with the persons who may seem to be in danger from them, because we can more easily suppose ourselves in their condition.

222. Nor do we readily sympathize with passions which we disapprove, or have not experienced. It is, therefore, a matter of prudence in poets, and other writers of fiction, to contrive

such characters and incidents, as the greater part of their readers may be supposed to symphathize with, and be interested in. And it is their duty to cherish, by means of sympathy, in those who read them, those affections only which invigorate the mind, and are favourable to virtue; as patriotism, valour, benevolence, piety, and the conjugal, parental, and filial charities. Scenes of exquisite distress, too long continued, enervate and overwhelm the soul: and those representations are still more blamable, and cannot be too much blamed, which kindle licentious passion, or promote indolence, affectation, or sensuality. Of the multitudes of novels now published, it is astonishing and most provoking to consider, how few are not chargeable with one or other of these faults, or with them all in conjunction. But immoral or extravagant novels would not be brought to market, nor of course written, if from the buyers of such things there were not a *demand* for extravagance and immorality.

223. Let us cherish sympathy. By attention and exercise it may be improved in every man. It prepares the mind for receiving the impressions of virtue; and without it there can be no true politeness. Nothing is more odious, than that insensibility, which wraps a man up in himself and his own concerns, and prevents his being

moved with either the joys or the sorrows of another. This inhuman temper, however common, seems not to be natural to the soul of man, but to derive its origin from evil habits of levity, selfishness, or pride; and will therefore be easily avoided by those who cultivate the opposite habits of generosity, humility, and goodnature. Of these amiable affections, the forms of common civility, and the language of polite conversation, are remarkably expressive; a proof that goodbreeding is founded in virtue and good sense, and that a kind and honest heart is the first requisite to an engaging deportment.

224. The essential parts of goodbreeding are, to speak little and modestly of one's self, candidly of the absent, and affectionately to those who are present; to show, by our looks and behaviour, that we respect our company, and that their happiness or convenience is the chief thing we have in view; to sympathize readily and tenderly in their joys and sorrows; not to obtrude ourselves upon the conversation, or seek to draw general notice; and, in all ordinary cases, when we differ in opinion from others, to do it with that respect for them, and that diffidence in ourselves, which become a fallible creature who wishes to be better informed. Such behaviour cannot be permanent or graceful, where it is hypocritical; and

therefore they are greatly mistaken, who think, with lord Chesterfield, that goodbreeding consists in disguise, or that the malicious or the arrogant are at all susceptible of that accomplishment.

225. There are men, neither arrogant nor malicious, who sometimes, without bad intention, give offence, by saying or doing that which, if they had entered more readily into the views and circumstances of the company, their own goodnature would have determined them to avoid: while others apprehend so quickly the situation and sentiments of every one present, that they give no offence to any, but great satisfaction to all. Habitual inadvertence, or perhaps a disposition to be more attentive to one's self than to one's company, may have produced the unpoliteness of the former class of men; which will probably be found to arise from one's not having been accustomed, in the early part of life, to the society of well bred people. They, on the other hand, who have been much in the world, and have found it necessary, from the first, to accommodate themselves by obliging deportment to persons of various characters, acquire a great facility of conceiving what modes of conversation and behaviour will be most agreeable to those with whom they may happen to be associated. And thus it

appears, that the sensibilities, here comprehended under the general name of sympathy, may, by education and habit, be greatly improved; or greatly weakened, if not destroyed, by inattention and want of practice.

226. There is a third class of men that one has sometimes the misfortune to meet with, who affect what they call a bluntness of manners, and value themselves on speaking their mind on all occasions whether people take it well or ill. Now it is right that people should speak their minds; but the mind that is fit *to be spoken* (if I may express myself so strangely) ought to be free from pride, ostentation, and illnature; for from these hateful passions the bluntness here alluded to may generally be derived. Such people may have a sort of negative honesty; but of delicacy they are destitute. In their company one sweats with the apprehension of their committing some gross indecorum; for nobody knows what limits an indelicate mind may choose to prescribe to itself. From injury, punishable by law, they may abstain; but they often give such offence as amounts not to injury only, but to cruelty. The thief that picks our pocket does not so much harm in society, nor occasion so much pain, as they may be charged with who shock the ear of piety with profaneness, or tear open the wounds

of the bleeding heart by forcing upon it some painful recollection.

227. Sympathy with distress is thought so essential to human nature, that the want of it has been called *inhumanity*. Want of sympathy with another's happiness is not stigmatized by so hard a name; but it is impossible to esteem the man who takes no delight in the good of a fellow creature; we call him hardhearted, selfish, unnatural; epithets expressive of high disapprobation. Habits of reflection, with some experience of misfortune, do greatly promote the amiable sensibility of which we now speak. *Non ignara mali miseris succurrere disco*, says Dido, in Virgil. Inconsiderate men are seldom tenderhearted, and mere want of reflection leads children into acts of cruelty.

SECTION XI.

Of Taste.

228. That faculty, or those faculties, which fit us for receiving pleasure from what is beautiful, elegant, or excellent, in the works of nature and art, has in modern times been called *taste*. He who derives no pleasure from such elegance, ex-

cellence, or beauty, is said to be a man of *no taste:* he who is gratified with that which is faulty in works of art, is a man of *bad taste:* and he who is pleased, or displeased, according to the degree of excellence or faultiness, is a man of *good taste.* This way of expressing critical sagacity by an allusion to the sensations received by the tongue and palate, though it be now found in most of the languages of Europe, is of no great antiquity. Petronius, indeed, uses *sapor* in this sense: from which, as well as from many other circumstances, I suspect, that the trifling book which bears that name is partly modern.

229. Good taste implies several talents, or faculties. The first is *a lively imagination.* This qualifies a man for readily apprehending the meaning of an author or artist, tracing out the connection of his thoughts, and forming the same views of things which he had formed. Without this talent, it is impossible to form a right judgment of an author's work. Delicacy of connection, and such contrivances in a fable or story as tend to produce surprise, are among the chief beauties of poetry; but these a man of dull imagination is apt to overlook, or not to understand. This liveliness of fancy must be corrected and regulated by the knowledge of nature both external and internal, that is, both of the visible universe, and of

by which, supposing ourselves in the condition of other men, we readily adopt their sentiments and feelings, and make them as it were our own; and so receive from them some degree of that pain or pleasure which they would bring along with them if they were really our own. Without this moral sensibility, our minds would not be open to receive those emotions of pity, joy, admiration, sorrow, and imaginary terrour, which the best performances in the fine arts, particularly in poetry, are intended to raise within us; nor, by consequence, could we form a right estimate of the abilities of the author, or of the tendency and importance of his work.

233. The last thing requisite to form good taste is *judgment*, or *good sense;* which is indeed the principal thing, and may, without much impropriety, be said to comprehend all the rest. Without this, we could not compare the imitations of nature with nature itself, so as to perceive how far they agree or differ; nor could we judge of the probability of events in a fable, or of the truth of sentiments; nor whether the plan of a work be according to rule, or otherwise. For in every art certain rules are established; some resulting from the very nature of the thing, and the end proposed by the artist, and these are essential and indispensable rules; and others that may be called

mechanical or ornamental, which depend rather upon custom than upon nature, and claim no higher origin, than the practice of some great performer, whom it has become the fashion to imitate.

234. The violation of an essential rule discovers want of sense in an author, and consequently want of taste; for where good sense is not, taste cannot be. To depart from a mechanical rule may be consistent with the soundest judgment, and is sometimes a proof both of good taste and of great genius. Take an example or two: to divide a tragedy or comedy into five acts, and rigidly to observe, in dramatick fable, the unities (as they are called) of time and place, are rules, which, though many poets have observed, and many criticks enjoined them, are not essential. But, to make poetical persons speak and act suitably to their characters; to adhere, in history and philosophy, to truth, and in poetry to probability; and to give to every work, whether prose or verse, a moral tendency, with simplicity of contrivance and of style, and unity of design, are essential rules, which no writer is at liberty to violate.

235. All men, and even children, have something of taste, as appears from the pleasure they take in songs, tales, wit and humour, pictures,

and other imitations. But education and study are necessary to the improvement of taste; and it may be improved by various methods, some of which have been mentioned already. Whatever tends to enlarge, correct, or methodize, our knowledge, either of men or of things, is to be considered as a means of improving judgment, and consequently taste. History and geometry, and those parts of philosophy which convey clear ideas, and are attended with satisfactory evidence, are peculiarly useful in this respect; to which must be added such an acquaintance with life and manners, as fits a man for business and conversation.

236. Taste is further improved, as already hinted, by studying nature, and the best performances in art. Among these are to be reckoned the Greek and Latin classicks; the most valuable of which are Homer, Xenophon, Demosthenes, Thucydides, Sophocles, Plutarch's lives; Terence, Cesar, Cicero, Sallust, Virgil, Horace, and Livy. He who has read these few authors with due attention, may be truly said to be a man of learning, and can hardly fail to be a man of taste. I need not add, that bad books, and bad company, not only deprave the taste, but also pervert the understanding, and poison the heart; and that the practice of reading even good books superfici-

breeds a habit of inattention alike unfriendly to intellectual and to moral improvement. It was formerly said, that we should read none but approved authors, and never leave a good one till we understand every point of his doctrine and every word of his language. To prepare us for study so rigidly accurate, an exact, and even a minute knowledge of grammar is necessary: indeed it is not easy to say, to what degree, and in how many differents ways, both memory and judgment may be improved by an intimate acquaintance with grammar; which is therefore, with good reason, made the first and fundamental part of literary education. The greatest orators, the most elegant scholars, and the most accomplished men of business, that have appeared in the world, of whom I need only mention Cesar and Cicero, were not only studious of grammar, but most learned grammarians; and Horace and Virgil, and most of the great authors above menmentioned, appear, from the wonderful correctness of their style, to have been the same.

237. Taste is also improved by reading the best books of criticism; particularly, the critical works of Horace, Quintilian, Longinus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and the poeticks and rhetorick of Aristotle. In Pope's notes on his translation of Homer; in Dryden's prefaces; in Addi-

son's papers on Paradise Lost in the fourth and fifth volumes of the Spectator; in Hurd's commentary on Horace's Art of Poetry and Epistle to Augustus; in Pope and Johnson's prefaces to Shakspeare, and in Mrs. Montague's Essay on his writings and genius; in Rollin's method of studying and teaching the Belles Lettres, and in the Abbe Du Bois' reflections on poetry and painting; you will find a great deal of good criticism perspicuously and elegantly expressed. My last remark on this subject is, that taste is greatly improved by cultivating all the generous, benevolent, and pious affections, and repressing pride, malice, envy, and every other selfish and wicked passion. Virtue is the perfection of beauty; and the love of virtue might have been, and perhaps ought to have been, mentioned as essential to true taste.

238. It cannot be denied, that some unskilful writers have obtained considerable reputation, and that inelegant modes of writing have frequently been fashionable. There have been men, who could prefer Pliny to Cicero, Lucan to Virgil, Waller to Spenser, and Cowley and Blackmore to Milton. But from this we must not infer, as some have done, that taste is a variable thing. Its principles are real and perma-

nent, though men may occasionally be ignorant of them. Very different systems of philosophy have appeared; yet nature and truth are always the same. Fashions in dress and furniture are perpetually changing; and yet, in both, that is often allowed to be elegant which is not fashionable: which could not be, if there were not, in both, certain principles of elegance, which derive their charm, neither from caprice, nor from custom, but from the very nature of the thing.

239. In the fine arts, the standard of excellence may be presumed to be still more permanent. There are now extant, statues, carvings, and remains of ancient buildings, which were the admiration of antiquity, and are as much admired now as ever. And there are authors, Homer and Virgil, for example, whom, for these two thousand years, all who understood them have considered as the greatest of poets. When an author, or when a work of art, has been long in possession of the publick esteem, and has been admired by the most candid and enlightened minds, it must be taken as a proof of extraordinary merit; and the dissatisfaction of a few cavillers may not unreasonably be imputed to ignorance or affectation.

240. To be pleased with novelty and imitation,

to prefer good pictures to bad, harmony to harshness, and regular shape to distortion; to be gratified with accurate representations of human manners; to be interested in a detail of human adventures, and more or less, according to the degree of probability: to look with delight on the sun, moon, and stars; the expanse of heaven; grand and regular buildings; human features expressive of health, sagacity, cheerfulness, and goodnature; colours, and shapes, and sizes, of plants and animals, that betoken perfection and usefulness; the scenery of groves and rivers, of mountains and the ocean; the verdure of spring, the flowers of summer, and even the pure splendour of winter snow; is surely natural to every rational being, who has leisure to attend to such things, and is in any degree enlightened by contemplation.

241. If this be denied, I would ask, whence it comes, that the poetry of all nations, which was certainly intended to give pleasure to those for whom it was made, should abound in descriptions of these and the like objects; and why the fine arts should have been a matter of general attention in all civilized countries? And if this is not denied, a standard of taste is acknowledged; and it must be admitted further, that, whatever tem-

porary infatuations may take place in the world of letters, simplicity and nature sooner or later gain the ascendant, and prove their rectitude by their permanency. *Opinionum commenta delet dies; naturæ judicia confirmat.*

CHAPTER II.

Of Man's Active Powers.

SECTION I.

Of Free Agency.

242. ACTION implies motion; but there may be motion, as in a clock, where, *properly* speaking, there is no agent. Many motions necessary to life are continually going on in the human body; as those of the heart, lungs, and arteries: but these are not human actions, because man is not the cause of them. For the same reason, breathing, and the motion of the eyelids, are not actions; because, though we *may act* for a little time in suspending them, for the purpose of seeing or hearing more accurately, they commonly go on without any care of ours, and, while they do so, we are, in regard to them, not active, but passive.

243. In like manner, the casual train of thought, which passes through the mind in a reverie (see § 140) is not action; but when we interrupt it, in order to fix our view upon a par-

ticular object, that interruption, and the attention consequent upon it, are mental actions. Recollection is another, and investigation a third; but a remembrance occuring to us, without any exertion on our part, is not action, and our minds in receiving it, or becoming conscious of it, are as really passive, as the eye is in receiving the images of those visible things that pass before it when it is open. Nor is the mere perception of truth or falsehood a mental action, any more than the mere perception of hardness: the stone, which we feel, we must feel while it presses upon us; and the proposition, which our judgment declares to be true, we must, while we attend to it and its evidence, perceive to be true. But to exert our reason in endeavouring to find out the truth, or to be wilfully inattentive to evidence, are actions of the mind; the one laudable, and becoming our rational nature, the other unmanly and immoral.

244. All action is the work of an agent, that is, of a being who acts; and every being who acts is the beginner of that motion which constitutes the action. The bullet that kills a man, the explosion that makes it fly, the sparkles from the flint which produce the explosion, and the collision of the flint and steel whereby the sparkles are struck out, are none of them agents, all being passive

and equally so; nor is it the finger operating upon the triger that begins the motion, for that is in like manner a passive instrument: it is the mind, giving to the finger direction and energy, which is the first mover in this business, and therefore is, properly speaking, the agent. And if we were to be supernaturally informed, that the mind thus exerted was made to do so by the secret but irresistible impulse of a superiour being, we should instantly declare that being the agent, and the mind as really a passive instrument, as the finger or the gunpowder.

245. To ask therefore, and the question is almost as old as philosophy itself, whether man in any of his actions be a free agent, seems to be the same thing as to ask, whether or not man be capable of action. To every *action*, using the word in its *proper* sense, it is essential *to be free: necessary agency* (unless we take the word in a figurative sense, as when we say, the *agency* of the pendulum regulates the clock) is as real a contradiction in terms as *free slave*. If every motion in our mind and body is necessary, then we never move ourselves; and those motions, which are commonly called human actions, are not the actions of men, but of something else, which, according to the language of this theory, we must term *necessity*. To be an active being, is to have

a power of beginning motion; to act, or to be an agent, is to exert that power. Brutes have a power of beginning motion; which, being in them not accompanied with any sense of right and wrong, has been called *spontaneity;* to distinguish it from that power which rational beings possess of beginning motion, and which, being accompanied with a consciousness of moral good and evil, is denominated *liberty*.

246. Mental actions were mentioned; and them the mind performs without any dependence, that we can explain, on any bodily part. Bodily exertions do also take their rise in the mind, which has the power of beginning motion in the body, as well as in itself. But the human body, like every other piece of matter, possesses not in itself the power of beginning motion; and therefore bodily motions proceeding from the mind are not properly *actions* of the body; because, in regard to them, the body is only the passive instrument of the soul. The power of beginning motion, exerted of choice by a rational and intelligent being, may be called *volition* or *will*. It is in man the immediate cause of action. We *will* to exert ourselves in recollection or attention; and at the same instant the act of recollecting or attending is begun: we *will* to move our arm, or leg, or any particular finger, and instantly it is moved; and

we feel, that this energy of mind, which we call *will*, is the cause of the motion. But in what way, or by what means, the mind operates upon itself so as to produce attention or recollection, or upon the muscles that move the several parts of our body so as to give motion to those muscles, we can neither explain nor conceive.

247. Some things we can, and others we cannot do: we can walk, but we cannot fly. Those things it is in our power to do, which depend upon our will; and from them proceeds whatever may be called moral or immoral, virtuous or vicious, praiseworthy or blamable, in our conduct. For no man is seriously blamed or praised for that in the performance of which he is not considered as a free agent; that is, as one who had it in his power either to do or not to do. This, according to the sense of the words *agent* and *action*, as already explained, is saying nothing more, than that no man is seriously blamed or praised, except for actions done by himself, and not by another.

248. Our mind and body are put in motion by the will; and philosophers have said, that the will is determined by motives, purposes, intentions, or reasons. Granting this to be true, I cannot admit, that by such motives or purposes the will is *necessarily* determined. It is the will itself, or the

selfdetermining power of the mind, that gives a motive that weight and influence whereby the will is determined: in other words, it depends on ourselves, whether we are to act from one motive or from another. A man, for example, is tempted to steal. His motive to commit the crime is the love of money; his motive to abstain is a regard to duty. If he suffer himself to be determined by the former motive, he is a thief, and deserves punishment; if he comply with the latter, he has done well. Now all the world knows and believes, and the laws of every country suppose, that he had it in his power to act according to the impulse of either the one motive or the other; that is, that he had it in his power to give to either of them that influence which would determine his conduct.

249. To set this matter in another light. Action implies motion; and where there is not a power to begin motion, there cannot be action, there must always be rest. Now, though motion, when begun, may be communicated from one body to another, nothing, so far as we know, can begin motion, but mind. If therefore motives or purposes have in themselves a power to determine necessarily the mind to act, they must also in themselves possess the power of beginning or communicating motion; that is, they must

be either minds or bodies. But a motive, such as the love of money, or a sense of duty, is neither a mind, nor a body, and therefore cannot begin motion, nor consequently be of itself the immediate and necessary cause of action.

250. A motive may indeed raise within us a certain desire or aversion, or may itself be that desire or aversion when raised: but desire and aversion are so far from being understood to be actions, that in all the languages we know they are called by a name corresponding to the English word *passions*, and signifying, not acting, but suffering, or being acted upon. We may indeed act according to the impulse of aversion or desire; but still it is *we* that act; and it depends upon our will, upon our power of selfdetermination, whether we are to act according to that impulse, or not. A hungry man has a great desire to eat; but within his reach there may be victuals, which, though he knows to be good, he may refrain from eating; though at the same time he is conscious it is in his power to eat, notwithstanding any motive, a regard to health for example, that may urge him to abstain. Every man has an aversion to pain and death; but whether a soldier shall flee from both, or bravely in his country's cause set both at defiance, depends entirely upon himself; as long at least as

he retains the use of reason, and the power of managing his limbs; that is, as long as he is an accountable being.

251. There are writers, who maintain, that the human frame is wholly corporeal, and that there is no good reason for distinguishing between the soul and the body of man. This doctrine has been called materialism. If I could acquiesce in it, I should perhaps grant, that all human actions are necessary; because, being produced by one bodily part operating upon another, they must as really be the effects of mechanism, as the motions of a clock. But if this be true; and if motives, that is, thoughts and abstract ideas, have the power of producing human action; those motives or ideas must have the power of putting that great machine, the human body, or part of it at least, in motion, and must therefore themselves be either bodies, which is inconceivable and impossible, or spirit, which the materialist denies to be in human nature. Here is a difficulty, which it seems impossible to get over, without renouncing both materialism and necessity; that is, without admitting, that there is in man something which is not matter, and which has the power of beginning motion both in itself, and in the human body.

252. I do not here mean to enter minutely into

the question concerning liberty and necessity: first, because I have explained myself at some length on that subject in another place; secondly, because to give even a summary of all that has been written about it would take up too much time; and, thirdly, because in these moral inquiries I think it my duty to avoid controversy and unprofitable speculation, and confine myself to plain, practical, and useful truth. I therefore only add a few miscellaneous remarks. The first is, that the freedom of the human will is a matter of fact and experience, whereof the human mind is conscious, and which the language and behaviour of mankind in all ages prove that they did, and do, and must acknowledge. In all cases of conduct, in which I consider myself as an accountable being, I *feel* that I have it in my power to do or not to do, to speak or be silent, to speak truth or falsehood, to do my duty or neglect it. And were I to speak and act as if such things did not seem to me to be in my power, the world would charge me with affectation or insanity.

253. Even those few speculative men, and they are but few, who in words deny the freedom of the will, do yet in the ordinary affairs of life speak and act like other people; making promises, giving advice, laying down rules and precepts, blaming certain actions as what ought not to have

been done, and praising others as right and what ought to be done: the propriety of which conduct it is not easy to reconcile, in a satisfactory manner, to the tenets of those who teach, as the advocates for necessity do, that no past action of our lives could have been different from what it is, and that no future action can be contingent, or such as it is in our power to do or not to do. The condition of these theorists is similar to that of those who argue against the existence of matter. Both affirm what contradicts the opinion and experience, not of the vulgar only, but of the most acute philosophers, and of mankind in general: both say, they believe that, which is inconsistent with what common sense taught them to believe, and with what they would still have believed, if they had *kept to their natural sense of things*, and not perplexed themselves with metaphysical arguments: and both assert to be true what they cannot reduce to practice, and what is not warranted by christianity, or by the morality and politicks of any enlightened nation.

254. With respect to the christian religion, as concerned in this matter; it may be observed, that one strenuous fatalist urges the doctrine of necessity, as an argument, either in favour of atheism, or against the turpitude of vice; and that another zealous necessarian, who avows his belief both in

God and in Christ, seems to admit, that the testimony of the sacred writers is rather against necessity than for it. Judging, then, either from the affirmation of the one, or from the concession of the other, we must infer, that the christian religion and the doctrine of necessity are not friendly to each other; which is indeed what the asserters of liberty have generally maintained. If necessity lead to atheism, or if it confound the distinctions of vice and virtue, (and I not only agree with Mr. Hume, that it does either the one or the other, but am satisfied that it does both), it is surely subversive of all religion. And if the sacred writers seem to declare in favour of liberty, (which I agree with Dr. Priestley that they do); and if it is from them, and from them only, that I learn what christianity is; I must either question their infallibility as teachers, or I must with them declare in favour of liberty. But, though the belief of necessity would, if I were capable of it, be fatal to *my* religious and moral principles, I am far from thinking, that it must have the same effect on every other person: different minds may no doubt conceive of it differently. Yet it is remarkable, that some of its most distinguished advocates, of whom I shall only mention Spinosa, Hobbes, Collins, Hume, and Voltaire, were enemies to our faith; whereas

of the modern defenders of liberty I do not recollect one who was not a christian. The opinion of necessity, says bishop Butler, seems to be the very basis upon which infidelity grounds itself.

255. We are permitted, and commanded, to pray: we consider it as a high privilege, and most reasonable service: we feel that it produces good effects on the mind; and our religion promises particular blessings to those who piously perform it. But if every change in our minds for the better or for the worse, if all the blessings we can receive, and if our praying, or not praying, are all things necessary, and the unalterable result of a long series of causes, that began to operate before we were born, and still continue to operate independently on us, why is prayer, or indeed any thing else, enjoined as a duty? and how are we to blame for neglecting, or how can we be rewarded for doing, that which it is not possible for *us* either to do or to neglect? In like manner, if no past action of our lives could have been different from what it is, why do we blame ourselves for any action of our past life? we may as reasonably blame ourselves for not having learned to fly, or for not coming into the world before the present century. And yet, if we do not blame any part of our past conduct, we cannot repent of it; and if we do not repent, we cannot be saved. Here seems to be another strange and striking

opposition between the doctrine of the New Testament, and that of the fatalist. In short, all the precepts of morality and religion, all purposes of reformation, and all those sentiments of regret, selfcondemnation, and sorrow, which accompany repentance, proceed on a supposition, that certain actions are so far in our power, that we may either do them, or not do them. And most of the words we make use of in speaking of the morality of actions are, on the principles of those who deny free agency, unintelligible. Such are the words, *ought*, *ought not*, *moral*, *immoral*, *merit*, *demerit*, *reward*, *punishment*, and many others.

256. By a very zealous asserter of necessity some concessions have lately been made, which seem to convey notions of this doctrine, that are not much in its favour. He says, that nothing can be plainer than the doctrine of necessity; that it is as certain as that two and two are four: and yet he admits, that nine tenths of the generality of mankind will always disbelieve it. What can this mean but that nine tenths of mankind are irrational; or that necessity is an incredible thing, notwithstanding its being as certain as that two and two are four; or that the teachers of this doctrine are unable to explain it? Were it self-evident, I should grant, that argument could not make it plainer. But that cannot be selfevident,

which nine tenths of mankind deny, and which many of the acutest philosophers that ever lived have to the satisfaction of thousands proved to be absurd.

257. He admits, that, according to his doctrine of necessity, the Deity is the cause of all the evil, as well as of all the good actions of his creatures. What can this mean, but either that there is no difference between moral good and moral evil, between harm and injury, between crimes and calamities; or that the divine character is as far from being in a moral view perfect, as that of any of his creatures? The same writer affirms, that the doctrine of philosophical necessity is a modern discovery, not older than Hobbes, or, perhaps he might mean, than Spinosa. Strange, that a thing, in which all mankind are so much interested, and of which every man, who thinks, is a competent judge, and has occasion to think and speak, every day of his life; should not have been found out till about two hundred years ago, and should still, in spite of all that can be said for it, although as certain as that two and two are four, be disbelieved by all mankind, a few individuals excepted. I shall only add, that, if the Deity be, as this author affirms, the cause of all the evil, as well as of all the good actions of his creatures, resentment and gratitude towards our

fellow men are as unreasonable as towards the knife that wounds, or the salve that heals us; and that to repent of the evil I am conscious of having committed would be not only absurd but impious, because it would imply a dissatisfaction with the will of Him, who was the almighty cause of that evil, and was pleased to make me his instrument in doing it.

258. I deny not, that the opposite doctrine of liberty may be thought to involve in it some difficulties which our limited understanding cannot disentangle, particularly with respect to the divine prescience and decrees. But in most things we find difficulties which we cannot solve; nor can any man, without extreme presumption, affirm, that he distinctly knows, in what manner the divine prescience exerts itself, or how the freedom of man's will may be affected by the decrees of God. Such knowledge is too wonderful for us: but of our own free agency we are competent judges, because it is a matter of fact and experience; and because all our moral and religious notions, that is, all our most important knowledge, may be said to be either founded on it, or intimately connected with it.

259. As omnipotence can do whatever is possible, so omniscience must know whatever can be known. Every thing which God has determined

to bring *certainly* to pass, he must foresee *as certain:* and can it be thought impossible, that he should foresee, not as *certain* but as *contingent*, that which he has determined to be *contingent* and *not certain?* Or will it be said, that it is not possible for the Almighty to decree contingencies as well as certainties; to leave it in my power, in certain cases, to act according to the free determination of my own mind? Our bodily strength, and our freedom of choice in regard to good and evil, are matters of great moment to us; but the latter can no more interfere with the purposes of divine providence, than the former can retard or accelerate the motion of the earth. It would not be very difficult for a prudent man, who should have the entire command of a few children, to make them, in certain cases, promote his views, without laying any restraint on their will. Infinitely more easy must it be, for the Almighty and omniscient Governour of the universe, so to overrule all the actions of his moral creatures, as to make them promote, even while they are acting freely, his own wise and good purposes.

SECTION II.

Further Remarks on the Will.*

260. It was said, that the power of beginning motion, exerted of choice by a rational and intelligent being, may be called volition, or will. The word *will* has other significations; but I wish, at present, to use it in this sense. I call it a power of beginning motion; meaning by the term *motion* every change in the human mind or body which is usually denominated action. When we *will* to do a thing, we believe that thing to be in our power; and when we *will* we always will something, (and this something may be termed the object of volition); even as when we remember we always remember something, which may be called the object of remembrance. Things, therefore, done voluntarily, are to be distinguished from things done, like a new born infant's sucking, by instinct, as well as from things done by habit, like the constant motion of the eyelids.

261. *Will* and *desire* are not the same. What we *will* is an action, and our own action: but we may *desire* what is not action, as that our friends may be happy, or what is no action of ours, as

* See Dr. Reid's Essays on the active powers of man.

that our friends may behave well. Nay, we may *desire* what we do not *will*, as when we are thirsty and abstain from drink on account of health; and we may *will* what we *have an aversion to*, as when, on the same account, we force ourselves to swallow a nauseous medicine. Let us also distinguish between *will* and *command;* although, in common language, what a man commands is often called his will. We *will* to do some action of our own; we *command* an action to be done by another. Desires and commands are also, in popular language, confounded: but here too we must distinguish. " O if such a thing were given " me," is not the same with " give me such a " thing:" and if a tyrant, to get a pretence for punishing, were to command what he knew could not be done, it might be a command without desire.

262. I said, that when we *will* to do a thing, we believe that thing to be in our power, or to depend upon our will. In exerting myself to raise a weight from the ground, I believe either that I can raise it, or that it is in my power to try whether I can raise it or not. A very great weight, which I know to be far above my strength, I never attempt to raise. I never exert myself for the purpose of flying; I never *will* to speak a language I have not learned; because I know it to

be out of my power. Our will may, however, be exerted in attempting to do what we know to be at the first trial impracticable; as when one begins to learn to perform on a musical instrument: but in this case we believe, that frequent attempts, properly directed, will make the thing possible, and at last easy. And we know, that the first principles of musical performance, as well as of other arts, are adapted to the ability of a beginner, and consequently in his power.

263. Some acts of the will are transient, others more lasting. When I *will* to stretch out my hand and snuff the candle, the energy of the will is at an end as soon as the action is over. When I *will* to read a book, or write a letter, from beginning to end, without stopping, the will is exerted till the reading or the writing be finished. We may *will* to persist for a course of years in a certain conduct; to read, for example, so much Greek every day, till we learn to read it with ease: this sort of will is commonly called a resolution. We may will or resolve to do our duty on all occasions as long as we live; and he who so resolves, and perseveres in the resolution, is a good man. A single act of virtue is a good thing, but does not make a man of virtue: he only is so, who resolves to be virtuous, and adheres to his purpose. Aristotle rightly thought, that virtue

consists not in transient acts, but in a settled habit or disposition; agreeable to which is the old definition of justice, *constans et perpetua voluntas* suum cuique tribuendi. So of the other virtues. He is not a temperate or valiant man, who is so now and then only, or merely by chance; but he who is intentionally and habitually temperate or valiant. Him, in like manner, we judge to be a vicious character, not who through the weakness of human nature has fallen into transgression, but who persists in transgression, or intends to transgress, or is indifferent whether he trangress or not, or resolves that he will not take the trouble to guard against it.

264. For actions wherein the will has no concern, a man, as observed already, is not accounted either virtuous or vicious, and can deserve neither reward nor punishment, neither praise nor blame. This is the universal belief of rational nature, and on this the laws of all enlightened nations are founded. It is true, that laws have entailed inconvenience upon the guiltless offspring of the guilty. But such laws either were unjust, or were made with a political view, to restrain fathers the more effectually from certain great crimes, high treason for example: in which last case they may, as many human laws are, be good upon the whole, because profitable to the community, though a grievous

hardship to individuals. Inequalities of this kind are unavoidable. At my return from a long voyage my health may require the refreshments of the land; and yet, if there be a suspicion of plague in the ship, I may, without having any reason to charge the government with cruelty, be forced to remain on board many days, even though my death should be the consequence. With his parents a man is indeed so closely connected, that, even where the law does not interpose at all, he may, and often must, derive good from their virtue, or evil from their misconduct; competence, for example, from their industry, or poverty from their sloth; a sound constitution from their temperance, or hereditary disease from their sensuality; honour from their merit, or dishonour from their infamy. This may suggest an obvious and important lesson both to parents and to children.

SECTION III.

Principles of Action.

265. In strict propriety of speech, and in all rational inquiry concerning the imputableness of actions, every thing that is called *human action* is supposed to depend on the human will. But, in

common language, the word *action* is used with more latitude, and animals are often said to *act*, or do, what they do not will, and even what they do not think of. An infant is said to act, while it sucks; a bee, while it gathers honey; and a man, while he takes snuff without knowing that he takes it, as I have been told that snuff takers often do. In speaking of the *principles of action*, I must now use the word in this inaccurate and popular sense. A *principle of human action* is, that which incites a man to act.* Our principles of action are many and various; I will not undertake to give a complete enumeration: it may be sufficient to specify a few of the most remarkable; which I arrange under the following heads. 1. Instinct. 2. Habit. 3. Appetite. 4. Passions and Affections. 5. Moral Principles; deferring these last at present, as they will find a place hereafter in moral philosophy.

Of Instinct.

266. Instinct is a natural impulse to certain actions which the animal performs without deliberation, without having any end in view, and frequently without knowing what it does. It is thus the new born infant sucks, and swallows, and

* See Dr. Reid on the active powers of man

breathes; operations, which in their mechanism are very complex, though attended with no labour or thought to the infant: thus, when hungry, it has recourse to the mother's milk, before it knows that milk will relieve it: thus it cries while in pain or in fear; and thus it is soothed by the simple song and soft accents of the nurse. Similar instincts are found in the young of other animals: and, as they advance in life, the same unerring principle, derived not from experience, or art, or habit, but from the allwise Author and Preserver of their being, makes them provide for themselves and their young, and utter those voices, betake themselves to that course of life, and use those means of selfdefence, which are suitable to their circumstances and nature.

267. The arts of man are all of human invention, and advance to perfection gradually; and long practice is necessary to make us perform in them with ease. But the arts of inferiour animals, and their *manufactures* (if we may use so strong a catachresis); the nest of the bird, for example, the honey and honeycomb of the bee, the web of the spider, the threads of the silkworm, the holes or houses of the beaver, &c. are not invented or taught, are uniform in all the individuals of a species, are not more exquisite now than they were four thousand years ago, and, except where

outward circumstances are unfavourable, are all perfect in their kind. Those things, however, which the more sagacious animals may *be taught* to do, are more or less perfectly done, according to their degree of sagacity, and the skill and pains employed in their education.

268. Instinct, being partly intended to make up for the weakness or the want of understanding in animals, is more or less necessary to their preservation and comfort, according as the understanding is more or less defective. In the beginning of life we do much by instinct, and little by understanding: when we have got the use of reason, the case is in some measure reversed. Yet, even when arrived at maturity, there are occasions innumerable on which, because reason cannot guide us, we must be guided by instinct. Reason informs us, that we must do a certain action, swallow our food, for example, stretch out our arm, move our limbs, &c.: but *how* the action is done we know not; we only know that it follows or accompanies an energy of our will. We will to swallow, to walk, &c. and the very complex machinery of nerves and muscles necessary to those actions is set agoing by instinct, and instantly produces them. There are actions too, as the motion of our eyelids, which must be done so frequently, that, if we were obliged to

intend and will them every time they are done, we could do nothing else: these, therefore, are generally instinctive. And sometimes, for our preservation, we must act so suddenly, that there is no time for determination and willing; as when we pull away our hand from any thing that burns it, shut our eyes against a stroke that seems to be aimed at them, or throw out our arm to recover the balance of our body when in danger of falling. Such motions may also be ascribed to instinct, as well as those efforts which animals, in immediate danger of death by drowning, strangling, &c. make to preserve themselves.

269. Our proneness to imitation is also, in some degree, instinctive. In the arts indeed, as painting and poetry, imitation is the effect of will and design. But a child who lives in society learns of himself to speak, though no particular pains be taken to teach him; and acquires at the same time the accent, and frequently the sound of voice, of those with whom he lives, as well as their modes of thinking and acting. What a happiness, then, is it for a young person to be brought up in the company of the wise and the good. Wild men, who in their younger years lived savage, solitary, and dumb, and were afterwards brought into civilized society (a few instances there have been of such), were found incapable

of acquiring either speech or a right use of reason, though pains were taken to teach them both. In many cases children, and in some cases grown men, may be said to *believe* by instinct. Thus an infant believes what a man seriously tells him is true; and that what has once or twice happened in certain circumstances, will, in the same circumstances, happen again; as in the case of his finger having been burned by the candle. And thus we all believe, that things *are* as they appear to our *senses*, and that things *were* what we *remember* them to have been.

Of Habit.

270. The word habit is used in two different significations, which frequently are, and may without inconvenience be, confounded in common language. It denotes a facility of doing a thing acquired by having frequently done it; in this sense of the word, *habit* can hardly be called a *principle of action*. (See § 265.) Habit is a principle of action, when, in consequence of having frequently done a thing, we acquire an inclination to do it. A man, who is accustomed to walk every day at a certain hour, is uneasy if he be kept from walking: and they who read much are never happy at a distance from books. Choose the best course of life, said an ancient moralist, and cus-

tom will make it the most pleasant. If frequency of performance did not produce facility, art would be impossible; but why the one should produce the other we cannot explain; we can only say that such is the law of our nature. And if doing a thing frequently did not breed an inclination to do it, the improvement of our nature would be impossible, and we could hardly be said to be moral beings. Without instinct an infant could not live to be a man, and without habit a man would always continue as helpless as an infant.

271. Habit, in both senses of the word, is observable in the more sagacious brutes, and in none more than in dogs trained to hunting, and horses inured to the discipline of war. The war-horse not only learns to obey command, but is impetuous to obey it; and the beagle seems to take as much delight as his master in the sports of the field. The power of habit in forming rational beings to vice or virtue, to elegant or rustick manners, to attention or inattention, to industry or idleness, to temperance or sensuality, to passionateness or forbearance, to manual dexterity or the want of it, is universally acknowledged: something, no doubt, depends on the peculiar constitution of different minds; and something too, perhaps, on the structure and temperament of different bodies: but in fashion-

ing the character, and in giving impulse and direction to genius, the influence of habit is certainly very great.

272. As in early life our powers of imitation are strongest, our minds most docile, and our bodily organs most flexible, so good or bad habits, both mental and corporeal, are then most easily acquired. Hence the necessity of early discipline, the unspeakable advantages of a good education, and the innumerable evils consequent upon a bad one. It amazes one to consider what progress, in the most difficult arts, may be made, when our faculties of mind and body are properly directed in the beginning of life; and how easy an action, which at first seemed impracticable, comes to be when it has grown habitual. Performances in musick and painting, and many other sorts of manual dexterity, might be mentioned as examples: to say nothing of those barbarous arts of balancing, tumbling, and legerdemain, which in all ages have been deemed so wonderful, that the clown is inclined to impute them to magick, and even the more considerate spectator, when he first sees them, can hardly believe his own eyes.

273. But nothing in a more astonishing manner displays the power of habit, or rather of habit and genius united, in facilitating the performance of the most complex and most difficult exertions of

the human mind, than the eloquent and unstudied harangue of a graceful speaker, in a great political assembly. It is long before we learn to articulate words; long before we can deliver them with exact propriety; and longer still before we can recollect a sufficient variety of them, and, out of many that may occur at once, select instantly the most proper. Then, the rules of grammar, of logick, of rhetorick, and of goodbreeding, which can on no account be dispensed with, are so numerous, that volumes might be filled with them, and years employed in acquiring the ready use of them. Yet, to the accomplished orator all this is so familiar, in consequence of being habitual, that, without thinking of his rules, or violating any one of them, he applies them all; and has, at the same time, present to his mind whatever he may have heard of importance in the course of the debate, and whatever in the laws or customs of his country may relate to the business in hand: which, as a very acute and ingenious author observes, "if it were not more common, "would appear more wonderful, than that a man "should dance blindfold, without being burned, "amidst a thousand red hot plowshares."*

* See Reid on the Active Powers of Man. Essay III.

Of Appetite.

274. The word appetite in common language often means hunger, and sometimes, figuratively, any strong desire. It is here used to signify a particular sort of uneasy feeling in animals, returning at certain intervals, and demanding such gratification as is necessary to support the life of the individual, or to continue the species. The gratification being obtained, the appetite ceases for awhile, and is afterwards renewed. Hunger and thirst are two of our natural appetites; their importance to our preservation is obvious; brutes have them as well as we; and the same remarks that are here made on the one, may, with a little variation, be made on the other. Hunger is a complex sensation, and implies two things quite different from each other, an uneasy feeling and a desire of food. In very young infants it is at first only an uneasy feeling; which, however, prompts the little animal instinctively to suck and swallow such nourishment as comes in his way, and without which he must inevitably perish. Afterwards, when experience has taught him that the uneasy feeling is to be removed by food, the one suggests the other to his mind, and hunger becomes in him the same complex feeling as in us. In the choice of food, the several species

of irrational animals are guided, by instinct chiefly, to that which is most suitable to their nature: and in this respect their instinct is sometimes less fallible than human reason. The mariner in a desert island is shy of eating those unknown fruits, however delectable to sight and smell, which are not marked with the pecking of birds.

275. Before we cease to be infants, our reason informs us that food is indispensable; but through the whole of life appetite continues to be necessary, to remind us of our natural wants, and the proper time of supplying them: for as nourishment becomes more needful, appetite grows more clamorous; till at last it calls off our attention from every thing else, whether business or amusement; and, if the gratification be still withheld, terminates in delirium and death. Hunger and thirst are the strongest of all our appetites, being the most essential to our preservation: it is generally owing to criminal indulgence, when any other appetite acquires unreasonable strength. In obeying the natural call of appetite, in eating when hungry, or drinking when thirsty, there is neither virtue nor vice; unless by so doing we intentionally promote some good purpose, or violate some duty. But rightly to manage our appetites, so as to keep them in due subordination to reason, is a chief part of virtue: as the unlimited or licen-

tious indulgence of them degrades our nature, and perverts all our rational faculties.

276. Rest after motion is essential to life, as well as food after fasting; and, when rest becomes necessary, nature gives the sensation of *weariness;* which, like hunger and thirst, comes at last to be irresistible, is made up of an uneasy feeling and a desire of a certain object, goes off on being gratified, and after a certain interval returns. But we must not call weariness an appetite, nor is it commonly called so. Appetite prompts to action, weariness to rest; appetite rises though no action have preceded, weariness follows action as the effect follows the cause We have a sort of appetite for action in general: it may be called *activity;* and, when excessive or troublesome to others, is termed restlessness: for, as action is necessary to our welfare both in mind and body, our constitution would be defective, if we had not something to stimulate to action, independently on the dictates of reason. This activity is very conspicuous in children; who, as soon as they have got the faculty and habit of moving their limbs, and long before they can be said to have the use of reason, are, when in health and awake, almost continually in motion. It is, however, through the whole of life, so necessary, that without it there can be no happiness. To a person of a sound constitution

idlenes is misery: if long continued, it impairs, and at last destroys, the vigour of both the soul and the body.

277. It were well for man, if he had no appetites but those that nature gave him; for they are but few; and they are all beneficial, not only by ministering to his preservation and comfort, but also by rousing him to industry and other laudable exertions. But of *unnatural* or artificial appetites, if they may be called *appetites*, which man creates for himself, there is no end; and the more he acquires of these, the more he is dependent, and the more liable to want and wretchedness. It behooves us, therefore, as we value our own peace, and the dignity of our nature, to guard against them. Some of the propensities now alluded to may, no doubt, have been occasioned in part by disease of body, or distress of mind; but they are, in general, owing to idleness and affectation, or to a foolish desire of imitating fashionable absurdity. They are not all criminal, but they all have a tendency to debase us; and by some of them men have made themselves disagreeable, useless, contemptible, and even a nuisance in society. When I mention tobacco, strong liquors, opiates, gluttony, and gaming, it will be known what I mean by unnatural appetite, and acknowledged that I have not characterised it too severely.

SECTION IV.

The subject continued. Passions and Affections.

278. The word *passion* properly means suffering; but is seldom used in that sense, except when we speak of *our Saviour's passion*, as in the beginning of the Acts of the apostles. By passion the common people mean little more than anger; and anger is a passion, but it is only one of many. Some philosophers have used the word to signify whatever moves us to action; but this use of it is too extensive. The sense in which I here understand it will appear by and by. When we act voluntarily, it is in order to obtain what is, or appears to be, good, or to avoid what is, or appears to be, evil. Good, real or apparent, excites desire; evil, real or apparent, excites aversion: but in this acceptation, the words *desire* and *aversion* are used with great latitude. Desires and aversions are two copious classes of passions; and assume different forms, and are called by different names, according to the nature of the good or evil that draws them forth, and its situation with respect to us. For example; present good gives rise to *joy*, probable good to *hope;* present evil to *sorrow*, probable evil to *fear;* good qualities in another person

raise our *love*, or *liking;* evil qualities in another our *dislike*, &c.

279. Each variety of desire and aversion, as well as every other passion, is agreeable in the feeling, or is disagreeable; and, if in any degree violent, is attended with some commotion in the body as well as in the mind: for, by varying the human countenance and attitude, painters may express almost every passion; which could not be, if the passions did not make perceptible changes in the outward appearance of the body. A passion, therefore, may be said to be "a commotion "of the soul, attended with pleasure or pain, af- "fecting both the mind and the body, and arising "from the view of something which is, or appears "to be, good or evil." If we rank *admiration* among the passions, which I think is commonly done, we must vary the last clause thus: "and "arising from the view of something which is, or "appears to be, good, or evil, or uncommon." In treating of the passions, I shall, first, make some general remarks upon them; secondly, I shall endeavour to arrange them in classes, and describe the more remarkable ones; and I shall conclude with some rules for the right management of this part of our moral nature. I do not promise, I will not even attempt, a complete enumeration. Some passions may, probably, occur

to me, which yet I shall forbear to mention, because I would not put my hearers in mind of them.

280. These emotions have got the name of passions, probably, because in receiving the first impressions of them our mind is passive, being acted upon, or influenced, by the body, by external things, or by the imagination. We may distinguish between the *cause* of a passion and its *object*. The *cause* is that which raises it; the *object* is that towards which it prompts us to act, or on which it inclines us to fix our attention. The cause and the object of a passion are often, but not always, one and the same thing. Thus present good is both the cause and the object of *joy;* we rejoice *in* it, and we rejoice *on account* of it. But of *love* or *esteem*, the cause is some agreeable quality, and the object is some person supposed to possess that agreeable quality: of *resentment*, in like manner injury is the cause, and the injurious person the object.

281. That may be well enough understood which it is not easy to describe philosophically. This part of human nature is, in general, so well understood, that most people know what will draw forth the passions of men, and in what manner those passions operate; yet a complete analysis of them is still, if I mistake not, a desideratum in moral science. The following sketch (for the *out-*

line of which I am indebted to Dr. Watts) may have its use, but is very susceptible of improvement. The difficulties attending this subject arise from several causes: from the insufficiency of human language, which does not supply a name for each form and variety of human affection, and of course makes it necessary to express different affections by the same name; from the complex nature of the passions themselves, as they vary their appearance in men of different characters, and in the same man at different times and in different circumstances; and perhaps too from that partiality, which inclines us to think and speak too favourably of those passions that most easily beset ourselves, and with too little favour of such as may seem to predominate in other men.

282. The passions have been variously arranged, according to the various views which have been taken of them. They may be divided into pleasant and painful. Criminal passions bring pain; virtuous affections pleasure. And, therefore, to cherish good affections makes a man happy, and to indulge evil passions makes him wretched: happiness being rather a habit of the mind, than a thing that depends on outward circumstances: for, amidst the greatest worldly prosperity, the state of a man's mind, who is haunted with the horrours of a guilty conscience, or with envy,

jealousy, malice, and other evil passions, may make him completely miserable; and disease and poverty united will not make that person unhappy, who has a good conscience, and is piously resigned to the divine will. It may be objected, that some evil passions, as revenge, give pleasure; and that some good ones, pity for example, are painful. But the answer is easy. Of pity, as both a painful and a pleasurable emotion, I have spoken already (§ 190): and, with respect to revenge, I shall only observe at present, that though it may to an indelicate and inconsiderate mind give a momentary gratification, even as gluttony and excessive drinking may to a depraved appetite, it can never bring happiness along with it; because it is accompanied with many tormenting thoughts; because the promiscuous perpetration of it would unhinge society, and, in time, exterminate the human race; and, because the opposite virtue of forgiveness is one of the most amiable and most delightful (I had almost said, most godlike) affections whereof rational nature is capable.

283. Though the passions are justly reckoned principles of action, (indeed if we had no passions we should never act voluntarily, at least we should never act with alacrity or vigour), they may, however, be divided into such as *do not* prompt to action, and such as *do*. Of the former class, which

incline rather to rest, by fixing the attention upon their causes or objects, are *admiration*, *joy*, and *sorrow*. Of the latter, which are properly active principles, are *hope*, *fear*, *desire*, *aversion*, *benevolence*, *gratitude*, *anger*, &c. If *joy* in the possession of good be blended with the *fear* of losing it, this will produce an active propensity, disposing us to exert ourselves in the preservation of it. In like manner, if *sorrow* be mixed with *hope*, as in the case of one whose friend is dangerously ill; or with *fear*, or with *curiosity*, as in the case of one who hears he has lost a friend, but is not informed of the person: in these cases, *sorrow* will become active, and make a man exert himself in procuring relief for his friend in the one case, and in obtaining full information in the other. In all our active passions there is a certain degree of anxiety, restlessness, or desire; which, however, is not always painful. *Benevolence* is anxious to promote another's good, and *gratitude*, to make acknowledgments and requite the favour; but these are delightful emotions notwithstanding.

284. The passions may be divided into *selfish* and *benevolent:* the former aim at our own good, the latter at the good of others. A rational desire of our own happiness, which may be called *self-love*, is a powerful and useful propensity, and when rightly managed tends to happiness univer-

sal. In this respect, " true selflove and social are " the same." For that must be beneficial to the species, which, without injury to any, promotes the good of the individual; even as that which removes disease from one of the limbs contributes to the health of the whole body. Selflove, when excessive, or when injurious to others, may be called *selfishness*, and is a hateful disposition.

285. With rational selflove we must not confound those desires which men take to particular worldly things, as power, pleasure, and riches: for so far are these from making a man happy, that they often make him miserable. And it is not so much with a view to happiness, that ambitious, covetous, and sensual men pursue their favourite schemes, as in order to obtain power, wealth, and pleasure; to the possession of which they must know, if they know any thing, that happiness is not annexed. But without power, pleasure, wealth, say they, we cannot be happy, and therefore we pursue them. Sots, in like manner, say, they cannot be happy without the means of intoxication. But surely no man in his senses can believe that selflove is gratified by excessive drinking; or that brandy and tobacco* have any thing to do with

* I speak of them not as medicines but as luxuries

rational felicity, except, perhaps, by their tendency to destroy it. There have been drunkards, who could persevere in their vile habits, even while they knew that ruin and death would be the consequence. Such men being really their own enemies, it would be a strange abuse of words to say, that they were actuated by selflove: and the same thing may be affirmed of all who are enslaved to ambition, covetousness, or sensuality.

286. It has been questioned, whether there be in man any principle of pure benevolence, which aims at the good of others only, without any view to the gratification of one's self? By doing good to others we do indeed most effectually gratify ourselves; for what can give a man more pleasure, than to reflect that he has been instrumental in promoting a fellow creature's happiness! Yet every good man may be sensible, that he often does good, and wishes well, to others, without any immediate view to his own gratification, nay, without thinking of himself at all. In fact, if we had not principles purely benevolent, we could not gratify ourselves by doing others good. Children have been known to sacrifice their inclinations to the happiness of those they loved, when they themselves believed that their own interest would, in every respect, suffer by doing so. It is

not my meaning, that all children, or all men, are so disinterested; I only say, that pure benevolence is to be found in human nature: a doctrine, which, though to many it may appear selfevident, has been much controverted; and which there are men in the world, who, judging of all others by themselves, will never heartily acquiesce in.

287. It has also been made a question, whether there be in man a principle of universal benevolence? But does not every good man wish well to all mankind? and is not this universal benevolence? He who wishes harm to those who never offended him, or who cares not whether a fellow creature be happy or unhappy, is a monster, and deserves not the name of a man. It is true, that every man, even in civilized society, is not capable of forming extensive views of things, or of considering the whole human race, or the whole system of percipient beings, as the objects of his benevolence. But in every good man there is a benevolent principle, which makes him wish well, and do good, to every one to whom he has it in his power to be serviceable; and this sort of benevolence will do as much real good in the world, as benevolence universal. Accordingly our religion, which is suited to our general nature, and enjoins nothing as incumbent on all men, but what every man, of extensive or narrow views,

of much or little knowledge, may perform; our religion, I say, instead of recommending universal benevolence in the abstract, requires that we do good to all men, *as we have opportunity;* and commands us to love our neighbour as ourselves; declaring every man to be our neighbour who needs our aid, and to whom we have the means of giving it.

288. Concerning universal benevolence some have argued in this manner. "Benevolence arises "from love; and love from the view of agreeable "qualities in another. Now the good qualities of "others can be known to us in two ways only; "from personal acquaintance, or from informa- "tion. Of one whom we never saw or heard of, we "cannot know either the good qualities, or the "bad: him, therefore, we cannot love; but be- "nevolence is founded in love: therefore towards "such a person we cannot be benevolent. It fol- "lows, that there can be no such affection as "universal benevolence in human nature." This reasoning is good for nothing. Whether the principle in question be a part of our frame, is a query that relates to a matter of fact, and is therefore to be determined, not by argument, but by observation and experience. He who is conscious that he wishes well to all his fellow creatures, is a man of universal benevolence; and I have no

scruple to affirm, that every good man does so, and that to do so is in the power of every man.

289. Though one were to grant the premises of the foregoing argument, the conclusion would not follow: for, though we are not personally acquainted with every man upon earth, we know that all men possess certain agreeable qualities, for which we may and ought to love them. We know, that all men are percipient beings, are endowed with reason and speech, are animated with souls intelligent and immortal, are descended from our first parents, and are dependent on the same great Being on whom we depend. On these accounts, a good man loves all mankind; and may, therefore, if benevolence arise from love, be benevolent towards all mankind. The very circumstance of our all inhabiting the same planet, and of being all liable to the same wants and infirmities, will naturally serve as a bond of endearment; for similarity of fortune never fails to attach men to one another.

290. Some passions are called unnatural, as *envy*, *malevolence*, and *pride*. The reason is, because they are destructive of good affections that are natural. We naturally love excellence wherever we see it; but the envious man hates it, and wishes to be superiour to others, not by raising himself by honest means, but by injuriously pull-

ing them down. It is natural to rejoice in the good of others; but the malevolent heart triumphs in their misery. It is natural for us to regard mankind as our companions and brethren; but the proud man regards himself only, despising others as if they were beneath him. These unnatural passions are always evil; they make a man odious to his fellow creatures, and unhappy in himself; and they tend to the utter depravation of the human soul. Anger and resentment may lead to mischief; but, if kept within the due bounds, are useful for selfdefence, and therefore not to be altogether suppressed. We *may* be angry without sin; and not to resent injury is the same thing as not to perceive it, which would be insensibility. Nay, on some occasions resentment and anger are further useful, by cherishing in us an abhorrence of injustice, and fortifying our minds against it. But pride, malevolence, and envy, can never be useful or innocent; to indulge them, even for a moment, is criminal.

291. The passions have long ago been divided into *calm* and *violent*. Of the former sort, commonly termed *affections*, are benevolence, pity, gratitude, and, in general, all virtuous and innocent emotions. Of the latter, are anger, hatred, avarice, ambition, revenge, excessive joy or sorrow, and, in general, all criminal and all immo-

derate emotions; which, in imitation of the Greeks, we may call *passions*, using the word in a strict sense. The former are salutary to the soul, the latter dangerous. Those resemble serene weather, accompanied with such gales and refreshing showers, as prevent stagnation, and cheer by their variety: these may be likened to storms and other elemental commotions that terrify and destroy. Violent passions, very properly expressed by the Latin word *perturbationes*, always discompose the mind, and impair reason to a certain degree; and have been known to rise even to frenzy, and hurry men on to perpetrations, that have shortened their days, and made life miserable and death infamous. Many of them are attended with feverish symptoms; some give an unaccountable addition of bodily strength, which, however, soon ends in langour; and some have brought on fainting, apoplexy, and instant death. Nothing more needs be said to show the dreadful effects of violent passion, the indispensable duty of guarding against it, and the inexcusable temerity of speaking and acting under its influence.

292. The peripateticks, or followers of Aristotle, rightly thought, that the passions, dangerous as they are, ought not to be extinguished, even though that were possible; for that, being na-

tural, they must be useful; but that they are to be regulated by reason, and kept within the bounds of moderation. All those violent emotions, that urge us on to pleasure, or to the avoidance of pain, by a blind impulse, were by the schoolmen, who professed to derive their tenets from the same source, referred to what they called the sensitive appetite, because they seemed to partake more of the senses than of reason: and those calmer affections, that prompt us to pursue good rationally and with tranquillity, they referred to the rational appetite, because more nearly allied to reason than to the senses.

293. Pythagoras and Plato ascribe to the soul two natures, or, to give it in the words of Cicero, *animum in duas partes dividunt*, divide the soul into two parts, the one rational, the other irrational. In the rational nature they placed what they called tranquillity, that is, as Cicero explains the word, *placida et quieta constantia*, an easy and quiet consistency or uniformity. To the irrational part they referred what the Greeks called $\pi\alpha\vartheta\eta$, or passions, and the Latins, more properly *perturbationes*, or discomposures, those turbulent emotions both of anger and of desire, which are contrary and unfriendly to reason. There is, in Cicero's fourth book of Tusculan Inquiries, a particular enumeration of the several sorts of

perturbationes and *constantia*, according to the stoical system. The passage deserves attention; not so much for the philosophy contained in it, as because it ascertains the signification of some Latin words, which are not, for the most part, exactly understood.

294. Indeed, it is not very easy to comprehend what the stoicks say on this subject. Sometimes they would seem to require the extinction of all our passions, of all, at least, that are influenced by external things; for they hold, that nothing external is either good or evil, virtue being, according to them, not only the greatest, but the only good. At other times they are not so unfavourable to the passions; but grant indulgence to those that interrupt not that calm constancy and steady uniformity, which they supposed to constitute the glory of the human character. Thus they allow, that *gaudium*, or rational and tranquil joy, may be permitted to have a place in the human breast; but they proscribe *lætitia*, which it seems is a more tumultuous sort of gladness, as unworthy of a wise man. They are indeed licentious, and frequently whimsical, in their use of words; so that it is difficult to understand them in their own tongues, the Greek and Latin, and still more so to translate their doctrines into any modern language. Mrs. Carter has, however,

been singularly successful in her version of the discourses of Epictetus; to which she has prefixed an elegant introduction, of more value than all the rest of the book. To that introduction I would refer those who wish to form a just idea of the spirit and genius of the stoical philosophy.

295. It cannot be doubted, that pure and created spirits may be susceptible of emotions somewhat similar to human passions, as joy, gratitude, admiration, esteem, love, and the like. Hence some authors, in treating of the passions, have divided them into spiritual and human. The former we are supposed to be capable of in common with angels and other created spirits; the latter are peculiar to our present constitution as composed of soul and body. I need not take further notice of this division. Through the whole of the following arrangement I must be understood to speak of the passions, as they affect human creatures in the present state. Of the emotions of pure spirits we may form *conjectures;* but we can speak with certainty, and scientifically, of those only which are known to us by experience.

SECTION V.

The Subject continued. Passions and Affections.

296. The first class of passions that I shall take notice of comprehends *admiration*, and some other emotions allied to it. What is either *uncommon* in itself, or endowed with uncommon qualities, raises admiration or wonder. The sun is seen every day, and therefore is, in one respect, not uncommon; yet who does not *admire* his extraordinary magnitude and splendour, and beneficial influences! When, as in this example, the object we contemplate is transcendently excellent or great, admiration becomes *astonishment;* and an uncommon or unexpected object appearing on a sudden, raises within us an emotion called *surprise*. The passions of this class, when under no restraint, naturally express themselves by opening the mouth and eyes, raising the eyebrows, lifting up the hands and spreading the fingers: surprise, when violent, occasions starting and other nervous symptoms. These are all kindred emotions, and yet they are not the same.

297. *Admiration* and *wonder* may be distinguished. The former is generally a pleasurable passion, its object being for the most part good, or great, or both; the latter may be agreeable, or

otherwise, according to circumstances. We wonder at the folly and wickedness of some people, but can hardly be said to admire it. We wonder at the ingenuity displayed in harnessing a flea to a microscopick chariot; but the genius of the artist we do not admire, because it exerts itself in nothing that can be called either great or good; and because, though at first view it may yield a slight gratification, one is rather vexed than pleased to think that so much skill and time should be thrown away upon such a trifle. We may also distinguish between admiration and surprise. The sudden appearance of a person in a place where we did not expect him, may surprise us without being matter of admiration. And admiration, as already observed, is generally, if not always, pleasing; but it is not so with surprise.

298. We speak of disagreeable as well as agreeable surprises, and of astonishment that confounds, as well as of astonishment that delights; but of disagreeable or painful admiration I think we seldom or never speak. It would be an agreeable surprise, if, on going to visit a friend whom we believed to be dangerously ill, we should find him in perfect health; and, in contrary circumstances, our surprise would be painful in the extreme. Delightful astonishment we receive from the contemplation of pure sublimity (see § 168);

but the astonishment that seizes the young warriour, when the thunder of the battle begins, confounds at first and stupifies, though valour and a sense of duty soon get the better of it. This extreme and painful astonishment is sometimes, both in English and Latin, called *consternation*, as if it had a tendency to throw a man down. It is to be observed here, and while we treat of the passions it must not be forgotten, that as two or more passions really different, may in some respects, be similar, it is not strange, that the name of one should often be put figuratively for another. Instances might be given of the words *admiration*, *surprise*, *astonishment*, and *wonder*, used indiscriminately; but the philosopher must endeavour to distinguish as well as he can. From this licentious or indefinite use of language, disputes frequently arise where there is no real difference of opinion.

299. Admiration, says Plato, is the mother of wisdom; but, when excessive or misplaced, becomes folly. The young and inexperienced are most liable to it, and to them it is, unless directed to mean or improper objects, peculiarly beneficial: for curiosity prompts them to search for what is new, and admiration fixes their view upon it till it be imprinted on the memory. Our admiration of things great or good heightens

the pleasure we take in them; and the astonishment that arises when any thing uncommonly evil attracts our notice, serves to quicken disgust and preserve us from contagion. Horace considers what the Greeks called ἀθαυμασια, *nil admirari*, an exemption from admiration, as a security against those turbulent emotions that interrupt the happiness of life: but he is there speaking of that admiration which is bestowed upon unworthy objects. And in this view his doctrine is right: for whatever raises this passion is apt to kindle others of equal or superiour violence, as love, hatred, or desire; and where these are improperly directed, the mind must be subject to perturbations incompatible with virtue, and consequently with happiness. So much for the first order of passions, whereof the object is, in general, *uncommonness*. See § 279.

300. A much more copious class are those of the second order; which take their rise from the view of what is, or appears to be, *good* or *evil*. That which is, or appears to be, *good* or *agreeable*, raises some modification of *love:* that which is, or appears to be, *evil* or *disagreeable*, excites one form or other of *hatred*. Now a thing may seem to be good, either *in itself* simply, or both *in itself* and also *with a reference* to us: and that which, with respect to us as well as in itself, ap-

pears to be good, may seem fit, or in a condition, either to *do us good*, or to *receive good from us*. In like manner, a thing may seem to be evil, *in itself* simply, or both *in itself* and also *with a reference to us:* and that which, with respect to us as well as in itself, appears to be evil, may seem fit, either to *do us evil*, or to *receive evil from us*. From good and evil things thus arranged, rise three forms of *love* and of its opposite *hatred:* I shall call them *esteem* and *contempt; benevolence* and *malevolence; complacency* and *dislike*. Esteem, benevolence, and complacency, may be so blended as that one and the same being shall be the object of all the three; and this happens when that being appears good in itself, fit to do us good, and fit to receive good from us. In like manner, contempt, malevolence, and dislike, may unite so as to form one complex passion; as when one and the same object appears at once evil in itself, fit to do us evil, and fit to receive evil from us. Thus the passions in question may coalesce; but it is proper to analyze, and consider them separately.

301. That love, which we bear to a person whom we consider as a good character merely, without taking into the account his fitness either to do us good or to receive good from us, may be called *esteem*. We esteem strangers the moment we form a favourable opinion of their merit; and

those good men, whom we never saw or can see, and of whom we know nothing but by report: and this emotion (for *passion* it can hardly be called) inclines us to speak of them with affection and praise, and endeavour to make others think of them as we do. If there be any thing great or *uncommonly* good in such persons, *admiration* will heighten our esteem into *respect* and *reverence*. Things, as well as persons, are sometimes said to be the objects of esteem; we say, of a good book or a good picture, that it is *well esteemed:* but this use of the word is figurative. To esteem, and to value, are different things. However much we may value a good horse, a convenient house, or a fine garden, we can hardly be said to esteem them.

302. *Mind*, therefore, and *rationality* seem necessary to draw forth the affection we speak of. Nor are these alone sufficient. An acute understanding employed in sophistry, a great genius exerting itself in pursuits either criminal or trifling, may raise our *wonder*, perhaps our *astonishment*, but has no more claim to our esteem than the juggler, rope dancer, or dexterous player at cards. In short, *esteem* implies moral approbation; and probity, industry, and other moral virtues, are the objects of it. This being the case, it follows, that we ourselves, as moral beings, may

either rise or sink in our own esteem. *Selfesteem*, kept within due bounds, and warranted by the approbation of conscience, would be a rational as well as delightful emotion. But to keep it within due bounds is difficult and rare; for where is the man, who has a just sense, neither too high nor too low, of his own merit?

303. When we think too highly of ourselves, which we are very apt to do, selfesteem degenerates into the evil passions of *vanity*, *pride*, *arrogance*, and *insolence*. These, though nearly allied, are not the same. Pride and vanity may be distinguished. The proud man is sufficiently happy in the consciousness of his own supposed dignity; the vain man is not happy unless he believe that others admire him. Hence the former is reserved and sullen, the latter ostentatious and affable. Pride implies something, and generally not a little, of illnature; vanity is often officiously obliging. The vain man laughs, and is himself a ludicrous animal; the proud man is a hateful being, and unwilling even to smile; "or if he smile, it "is in such a sort, as if he scorn'd to smile at "any thing." It is generally true, that, in proportion as a man behaves proudly towards those whom he thinks beneath him, he is fawning and servile with respect to those whose superiority he feels himself constrained to acknowledge:

Swift observes, that the posture of climbing is pretty much the same with that of crawling. Pride and vanity, though in some things inconsistent, have been known to meet in the same character; but he may be vain who is not proud; and some men are too proud to be vain. The language of the former would be, admire me, and I will love you dearly; that of the latter, we value not your good opinion, and will give ourselves no trouble to obtain it.

304. Pride, arrogance, and insolence, may perhaps be thus distinguished. *Pride*, though no degree of it is excusable, may be so restrained by goodbreeding, as not to do injury, or give great offence to others: *arrogance* is always offensive, because in demanding more than its due (for this meaning appears in the etymology of the word), it manifests a petulant and injurious disposition, that disdains to be controlled by goodbreeding or any other restraint. *Insolence* is pride cooperating with arrogance and illnature in gratifying itself by insulting others: a temper utterly detestable, and such as no elevation of rank, of wealth, or of genius, can render pardonable in any person: nay, let a man's superiority be what you please, this alone is sufficient to cancel all his merit. And true it is, that they who are really distinguished by rank or by genius are not apt to be either in-

solent or arrogant; and, if not wholly exempt from pride, will however be careful to conceal it; which it is very much their interest to do. Of all writers the petty verbal critick is, I think, the most addicted to these enormities: Newton's meekness and modesty were as exemplary, as his genius was transcendant.

305. Pride is an artificial passion: in early life, unless enjoined by precept, or recommended by example, it seldom appears. The psalmist, speaking of his exemption from haughtiness, compares himself to a young child; and the humble docility of little children is, in the New Testament, represented as a necessary preparative to the reception of christian faith. But there is a sort of pride, from which a weak and inexperienced mind may be in danger, which refuses advice and instruction from an opinion that they are unnecessary: it is sometimes called *selfconceit*. This mental disease, at first infused by the fondness and flattery of parents perhaps, or of inferiours, gives rise to innumerable disappointments and ridiculous undertakings; and, if years and experience do not speedily remove it, hardens into incurable folly.

306. *Contempt* seems to stand in opposition to esteem, and arises from our considering an object as insignificant, or destitute of merit. But it is

is called *peevishness;* and renders one a torment to one's self, and a plague to others. Anger that breaks forth with violence, but is soon over, is termed *passionateness;* which, though not inconsistent either with goodnature or with generosity, ought to be restrained, because it is extremely inconvenient to friends and dependents, and may hurry a man on to the perpetration of crimes. Anger that is cool, silent, and vindictive, is a much worse passion: it is indeed so bad, that nothing good is to be expected from him who is capable of it.

365. Anger was implanted in our constitution for many valuable purposes, particularly for self-defence. Had we nothing irascible in us, there would be no end of injuries and indignities; but our knowledge of the nature and effects of anger makes us unwilling to provoke it: and thus men stand in awe of one another, which greatly contributes to the peace of society. If an injury be accompanied with circumstances of peculiar baseness or meanness, our anger is termed *indignation.* When anger exceeds the bounds of selfdefence, and contrives to bring real harm upon others, without any view to their good, or to that of the community, it becomes *revenge,* or *vengeance;* which, if generally practised, would introduce endless confusion.

366. For we are apt to think the injury we have just now received greater than it really is; and, therefore, if we were to retaliate immediately by word or deed, we should hardly fail to go beyond the due bounds, and so become injurious in our turn; which would call for new revenge from the opposite party; and that, being no doubt equally outrageous, would provoke to further vengeance, so that the evil would be incurable. Accordingly, revenge is forbidden by the laws both of God and of man. Savages, who enjoy not the protection of law, are their own avengers: whence they become addicted to this dreadful passion; and their vengeance is always excessive. One is not a competent judge in one's own cause: and, therefore, in regular society, persons of impartiality and considerable learning are appointed judges, to punish according to the exact amount of the transgression, and give the injured party reasonable redress, and no more.

367. When civilized nations go to war, or individuals go to law with one another, the principle of their conduct ought to be, not revenge, but a regard to publick good; which, in order to discourage injury, and defend our violated or endangered rights, compels us to have recourse to violent measures, that are justifiable

only from the necessity of the case. To go to law to plague a neighbour, or, in order to obtain reparation for a petty trespass that does neither us nor the publick any material injury, has in it more of malice than of love to justice. In war, to kill unnecessarily, or with a view to gratify private malevolence, is nothing less than murder; and is indeed discountenanced by the opinions and practice of all enlightened nations. While the enemy attacks or resists, it is lawful, because necessary, to repel force by force: when he submits, he is entitled to mercy, and even to the generosity of the conqueror. "Cowards are cruel, but the brave love mercy, "and delight to save."

368. There are many occasions, on which anger is not to be blamed; there are many, on which it is praiseworthy. The scripture intimates, that we may be angry without sin: nay, our Saviour himself once looked round with anger on the Jews, "being grieved for the hardness of their hearts." Aristotle has very perspicuously, though with great brevity, marked the boundaries within which this passion may innocently operate, and so as to deserve praise, instead of blame. Ὁ μεν ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος, ἔτι καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαι-

νέται.* He who is angry only on such occasions as he ought, and with such persons as he ought, and in such manner, and at such time, and for such length of time, as he ought, is actuated by a laudable anger. I shall make a few remarks on the several parts of this aphorism.

369. First, anger is laudable, when the *occasion* is such as renders it, in some degree, our duty: and that happens, when not to be angry would discover on our part a want of moral sensibility, or might prove an encouragement to wickedness in others. Parents overlooking a child's transgression, or being equally indulgent to him when he is, and when he is not, in a fault, would show a very blamable indifference: they could hardly take a more effectual way to corrupt his mind. A woman listening, without extreme indignation, to a licentious proposal from a man, would undoubtedly give him reason to think that she did not disapprove of it. To speak without emotion of any shocking instance of cruelty, ingratitude, injustice, blasphemy, or any other impiety, would make us suspect the speaker, not only of insensibility, but of a total want of principle. In cases of this nature, anger, under certain limitations, is a virtue, and the want of it a vice.

* Ethic. ad Nic. iv. 5.

370. With respect to indignities offered to ourselves, though we ought always to exercise forbearance, and be ready to forgive; yet if, on receiving a very gross and publick insult, we were to show no resentment, the world would blame our meanness of spirit, and think us not very fit to be entrusted with the important concerns of another, when we showed so little attention to our own. Peculiar circumstances, however, and the dignity of certain characters, might make great alteration in a matter of this kind. When, at the trial of Charles I, one of the bystanders spat in the king's face, and he, without speaking, or even looking at the traitor, calmly wiped his cheek with a handkerchief, he manifested a greatness of soul that had in it something more than heroick, and almost more than human. But what words can express our detestation of the ruffian who could perpetrate such a deed?

371. Anger is laudable, secondly, when a man is angry with *such persons* as he ought. The persons with whom we may reasonably be angry have been, most of them, specified already. Those towards whom we ought to exercise particular lenity and forbearance, are, first, our benefactors and friends, who may happen, in an unguarded moment, through the weakness of

human nature, to give us offence. Secondly, men eminently good, or whom we know to be good. Great reverence is due to good men; and if we only hint to them, in the gentlest terms, that they have without design done us injury, it will wound them as deeply as they ought to be wounded; they will readily make acknowledgments; and further reproach from us would be cruel. Thirdly, they who are liable to be too much disheartened by our anger, as dependents, affectionate children, persons in adversity, or of delicate health and spirits, or weak in understanding, are all entitled to peculiar tenderness; being all objects of pity, and not likely to offend, except through inadvertence. And, fourthly, those whom our anger would probably irritate, or to whom it could not do any good, we ought to bear with, or let alone, for our own sakes, as well as for theirs.*

372. I need not add, that to be angry with our Creator is, of all passions, the most shocking, unnatural, and inexcusable; insomuch that you may, perhaps, think the human heart, bad as it is, incapable of such impiety. But are not they guilty of it, who repine at Providence, either for bringing on them adversity which they may

* See Archbishop Secker's Sermons, vol. v.

fancy they do not deserve, or for making their neighbour prosperous beyond what they may think him entitled to? All such murmurings, envyings, and discontents, however common, and however disguised, are so many instances of anger, if not of hatred, towards both God and man. This ought to be seriously considered. Contentment with our lot, joy in our neighbour's prosperity, and resignation to the divine will, diffuse ineffable tranquillity over the soul, prevent the intrusion of anger, and every other painful passion, keep us at peace with all the world, and make us rejoice in God and in all his dispensations.

373. Thirdly, anger is laudable, when the *manner* of it is consistent with propriety and duty. It appears from what has been said, that our anger may be in too slight a degree; as, when it sets before others an example of blamable indifference, or tends to repress, and consequently to weaken, our moral sensibility. But excess of anger is the more common and more dangerous extreme: and it is hardly possible, and perhaps would not be expedient, to fix the boundary to which anger, consistently with innocence, may go. If this were ascertained, and people taught that they might safely proceed so far, they would think they might proceed a little

and a little further, till at last they might lose all remembrance of the boundary. For he who ventures to the utmost verge of innocence seldom fails to go beyond it: there is criminal presumption in venturing so far. Two rules, however, may be given on this head: the first, that our anger should never make us lose the government of ourselves; the second, that it should never do injury to others.

374. Anger, thus moderated, will not produce in us any commotion so violent as to hurt our health, or our character as men of prudence; nor will it break out in boisterous, or insulting language, far less in that impious and barbarous practice of cursing and swearing. To whatever degree we may be irritated, we shall do well neither to speak nor to act, while our agitation is such as to prevent calm reflection. It is said of Socrates, that, when greatly provoked, he became instantly silent; and, I suppose, he never had occasion to repent of his silence. And I have heard it recommended as a good rule, that, before a man gives way to his passion, he should take time to do something else that is not connected with it, and, if possible, retire for a moment, if it were only to recollect some passage of a favourite author, or even to repeat the letters of the alphabet. A little delay may do

good, and forbearance and mildness can never do harm.

375. Fourthly, anger is laudable, when it is *well timed*. Now it is not well timed, when it interferes with the performance of any important duty: to pray, or go to church, in anger, would be very indecent. Nor is anger well timed, when we have not had the means of knowing, whether any real offence has been given, or what is the true amount of the offence: mistakes of this nature are not uncommon; men are often offended without cause, and generally more than they ought to be. Anger is also unseasonable, when it is likely to give pain, or show disrespect to our company; or when it is directed against a man whose present temper of mind makes him, from an excess of levity, or from any other intemperance, deaf to reason, or in a condition of being easily exasperated. Such infirmities we all have; and, as we all wish allowances to be made for them in ourselves, we all ought to make the like allowances in favour of others.

376. Fifthly, anger is not blamed when it *continues no longer* than is reasonable. Lasting resentment is inexcusable, whatever the provocation may have been. It sours the temper, and so makes a man unfit for society, and unhappy in himself; it excludes from his mind benevolent

and pious thoughts; it cherishes pride, envy, contempt, and other violent and gloomy perturbations. "Let not the sun go down on your "wrath," is an excellent rule: but, for the most part, anger is censurable if it last an hour, or even a much shorter space. The moment the offender owns his fault, or seems desirous of reconciliation, our anger ought to be lost in forgiveness. Though he should not own his fault, nor give reason to believe that there is any change in his mind for the better, we shall do well to check our anger; or, if it be prudent to keep up an appearance of it, to take care that it be an appearance only: for, because he is injurious, it does not follow that we ought to make ourselves unhappy; which we shall certainly do, if we suffer this tormenting passion to take and to keep possession of us.

377. Let those who are prone to anger abstain at least from every outward expression of it, from reproachful words and vindictive deeds, and conceal it carefully within their own breast. In this way they may in time get the command of it; for most passions thus restrained become weaker. Let them resolve that they will abstain from anger for a day, for two days, for a week, for a month; and, if they adhere to the resolution, they will soon congratulate themselves on

the happy consequences. Let them, as much as possible, keep aloof from vexatious business, and from quarrelsome and litigious men; and avoid not only those altercations which may lead to anger, but disputes in general, and all that sort of reading which is termed controversial. Let them never for a moment imagine, as passionate men are apt to do, that their anger is incurable. They can manage it sometimes for the sake of interest: let them learn to manage it for God's sake, and for the sake of their fellow creatures and themselves.

378. *Gratitude* was mentioned as the passion that seems to stand in opposition to anger. We naturally love a man, because he is of the same condition with ourselves; we have goodwill towards him, because he stands in need of our aid, and may be profited by it; we love him yet more, if we know him to be of a mild disposition, and more still when he proves himself a friend to mankind, by acts of beneficence: but if we ourselves are the objects of that beneficence, our goodwill towards him, and our delight in him, ought to be very strong. When we thus contemplate our benefactor, not only with sentiments of complacency and benevolence, but also with a disposition to requite his favours, this mixture of pleasurable emotion is termed gra-

titude. The reverse is *ingratitude;* which, if it cannot be called a passion, because it occasions little commotion in the corporeal part of our nature, is however a vice of such enormity, that the most profligate man would be ashamed to acknowledge himself guilty of it.

379. *Si ingratum dixeris, omnia dixeris,* says the Latin maxim: if you call a man ungrateful, you have called him every thing that is base; you need say nothing more. The ungrateful man is an enemy to the human race; for his conduct tends to discourage beneficence: and he is unfit for society, and unworthy of it, because his indifference or hatred towards his benefactor proves him to be hardhearted and unjust. There are two forms of this vile disposition; one, when a man neglects to requite a favour when the requital is in his power; the other, when he returns evil for good. The last is no doubt the worst; but both are so bad that they are called by the same name; it being difficult to find in language an epithet of more reproachful import than *ungrateful.* Gratitude is a gentle affection, and makes no great commotion in the animal economy; yet is an active principle, and often displays itself visibly in the countenance, by raising the complexion, brightening the eyes, and sometimes filling them with tears.

that his eyes had a disagreeable glare, that his complexion was pale, his walk sometimes quick and sometimes slow, and that his general appearance betokened a discomposure of mind approaching to insanity.

393. It must be remarked here, that all are not equally quicksighted in discerning the inward emotion by means of the outward sign. Some have great acuteness in this respect, some very little; which may in part be owing to habits of attention or inattention. If there be men, as I believe there are, who study almost every countenance that comes in their way, whether of man or of beast, and if there be others who seldom mind things of that nature, it is reasonable to suppose that the former will have more of this acuteness than the latter. The talent I speak of is sometimes called *skill in physiognomy*, or *physiognomony;* which last form of the word is more suitable to its Greek original. Aristotle, and other ancient philosophers, wrote of it; and there were in ancient times persons whose profession it was to judge of the character from the outward appearance. One of these, having seen Socrates, without knowing who he was, pronounced him to be a very bad man, and enslaved to some of the worst passions in human nature. This was reported to Socrates, as a proof

of the presumption and folly of the physiognomist. But Socrates told them, that the man had discovered uncommon penetration; for that he was by nature subject to all those passions, though with the aid of reason and philosophy he had now got the better of them.

394. I remark, secondly, that as all human minds are not equally susceptible of warm emotion, so all human bodies are not equally liable to receive impressions from the mind. There is an awkwardness in the gestures of some people, and a want of meaning in their faces, which make the outward appearance pretty much the same at all times, unless they be under great agitation. This may be in part constitutional, and partly the effect of habit. That uniformity of feature which the stoicks affected, and in which they supposed the dignity of man in a great measure to consist, was no doubt in many of them assumed and artificial. But when we see the looks of one child continually varying as his thoughts vary, and those of another rarely undergoing any sensible change, we must impute this diversity to constitution, as we cannot suppose there is art or affectation in the case. In the countenance of Garrick there was more variety of expression than I ever saw in any other. This, after he became a player, he stu-

died and practised with extraordinary application: but the same thing was observable in him from his earliest years, as I have been assured by those who knew him when a boy.

395. I remark, thirdly, that all states of society do not allow equal scope to the outward and visible display of the passions. People in civilized life, from the awe in which they stand of the fashion, and of one another, are at pains to curb, or, at least, to hide, their more violent emotions: whereas, among savages, and persons little acquainted with decorum, there is hardly any restraint of this sort. Hence the intercourse of the latter is always more boisterous than that of the former, whether the conversation lead to joy or sorrow, merriment or anger; and their countenances are more deeply impressed with the traces of their predominant passions. Artists, too, as I have elsewhere remarked, who employ themselves in the nicer parts of mechanicks, have, generally, a fixedness of feature suited to the earnest attention which they are obliged to bestow on their work: while those who can ply their trade, and amuse themselves at the same time with discourse, have, for the most part, smoother faces, and features less significant.

396. Though there are many, who, from inattention, or other causes, are not acute in dis-

cerning human characters; yet, almost every man is, to a certain degree, a physiognomist. Every one can distinguish an angry from a placid, a cheerful from a melancholy, a thoughtful from a thoughtless, and a dull from a penetrating, countenance. Children are capable of this; and soon learn to fear the frowns, and take encouragement from the smiles, of the nurse; to participate in her joys or sorrows, when they see the outward signs of those emotions; and to stand more in awe of an acute than of a listless observer. The faces of the more sagacious brutes are not without expression. A curst cur and a wellnatured dog, a highmettled and a spiritless horse, are known by their countenance and carriage; and one might perceive intuitively, that wolves, foxes, polecats, and bulldogs, are dangerous animals; and that from asses, sheep, calves, lambs, and kids, one has nothing to fear. He who acknowledges these facts, and has observed what varieties of expression may be displayed in pictures and statues, will admit, that physiognomy is a sort of science, and not destitute of truth; and that by a careful observer considerable progress may be made in it.

397. But observe, that it is not from the countenance alone that physiognomists form their opinions. They must hear a man speak,

and see him move, and act, and smile; they must be acquainted with his general carriage, before they can decide upon his character. Painters have observed, that the position of the head is particularly expressive. Humility and sorrow appear in its hanging down; arrogance, in lifting it up, and tossing it back; some of the gentler affections, in its inclining to one side; and steadiness, in its rising erect between the shoulders. Love, hatred, joy, grief, entreaty, threatening, mildness, as well as admiration, anger, and scorn, have visible effects on the attitudes of the head. The hands too, which it is difficult to move gracefully, and which those who have not been accustomed to elegant society ought to move but seldom, and with caution; the hands, I say, by their motions and gestures, express various states of the mind, as admiration, hope, consent, refusal, fear, entreaty, and many others. But to describe those motions with accuracy is hardly possible; and, in a matter of this kind, inaccurate rules are worse than no rules at all, as they lead to affectation, and, consequently, to ungracefulness.

398. Some people show their characters more slowly than others. With one, you think yourself acquainted at first sight; of another, after long trial, you can make nothing, and, if he is very

cautious, he may elude your acutest observation for years. Hence let the physiognomist learn to be rather slow than hasty in forming a judgment. Let him be on his guard, though appearances are favourable; and let charity incline him to moderation, even when he may think he has certainly detected a dangerous, or disagreeable associate. We are often dissatisfied with a man at his first appearance, whom we afterwards find worthy of high esteem. In short, physiognomy is, in most cases, a conjectural science, and must not be implicitly trusted; for objections may be found to almost every one of its principles. Marshal Turenne, the greatest commander, and one of the best men of his time, had so unpromising a look, that when meanly dressed, as he often was, strangers were apt to mistake him for a simpleton. The same thing is recorded of another illustrious commander, Philopœmen: and our Charles II, though a man of great pleasantry and goodnature, had a stern and forbidding countenance.

399. Though I have long been studious of physiognomy, and sometimes flattered myself that I had skill in it, I dare not venture to treat of it in any other way, than by offering a few slight observations; well knowing, that on such a subject people are apt to run into wild theo-

ries more likely to mislead than to inform. The opinions of Aristotle, and other old writers, have been collected by Joannes Baptista Porta; whose book, though formerly in some esteem, will give little satisfaction to the unbiassed and inquisitive observer. He, and some others, have amused themselves with fancying likenesses between the faces of men and of brutes, and assigning that character to the man which predominates in the beast he resembles. They have also, from the proportions of particular parts of a human body, drawn conclusions with respect to the virtues or vices of the soul with which it is animated. And some would estimate the powers of a man's understanding by the shape of his skull, and the outline of his brow and nose. I have neither time nor inclination to enter into these inquiries; though I will not take it upon me to say, that they are wholly without foundation.

400. Of all the physiognomists I know, ancient or modern, the most eminent is John Gaspard Lavater, a clergyman of Zurich, in Switzerland. He has published two or three magnificent volumes, and adorned them with many curious drawings. The work has noble strains of eloquence, and proves the author to be a man of great piety and goodness of heart; and many of

his remarks on the human, and other figures, which he presents to his reader, are such as, I think, no person of observation can refuse to acquiesce in. But he is frequently whimsical, and in affirmation too positive. His style, though beautiful in particular passages, is, upon the whole, diffuse, incoherent, and declamatory, to such a degree, that, I believe, it would be a difficult matter to digest his notions into a system. Some persons in his neighbourhood having been poisoned with the wine in the eucharist, Lavater, supposing it had been done intentionally, preached a sermon with extraordinary vehemence; in which was this remarkable saying, which I mention, to show his confidence in his art: "I would "not advise the perpetrator of this horrid deed "to come in my way; for I shall certainly know "him by his look, if ever I set my eyes upon "him." Lavater is a man of genius and penetration, and a good deal of entertainment may be found in his book. But I am afraid it will not teach sagacity to those on whom nature has not bestowed that talent; nor form to habits of minute attention those who are habitually inattentive. And if it should encourage the unskilful to form rash judgments, there is reason to apprehend that it may do more harm than good. I shall not attempt to give a more particular

account of it; for that would lead me too far from my present purpose.

401. Every body knows, that virtuous and innocent affections give an agreeable expression to the countenance, and criminal passions the contrary. Anger, discontent, despair, disfigure the features, distort the limbs, and give dissonance to the voice; while goodhumour, contentment, hope, joy, benevolence, have a pleasing effect in setting off the body to advantage. Emotions that are innocent, and at the same time, in some degree, painful, as pity and rational sorrow, discompose the features; but such discomposure, far from being unseemly, may be even captivating: beauty in tears has been found irresistible. When a passion becomes habitual, it is reasonable to suppose, that those muscles of the brows, eyes, nostrils, cheeks, and mouth, over which it has influence, will, by acting continually in the same way, produce traces in the countenance, and fix upon it a visible character. This appears even in early life: a peevish or goodhumoured, a cheerful or melancholy, boy, soon contracts what we call a peevish or goodhumoured, a cheerful or melancholy, look. And, if these dispositions continue to predominate in him, the lines produced by them in the several parts of the face, will, in time, become as per-

manent as those which are seen in the palm of the hand. What it may be, which connects certain emotions of the soul with certain configurations of the muscles of the face, and certain attitudes of the head and limbs, I cannot determine; Des Cartes, and others, have inquired into this matter, but without success; and, till the union of the soul and body be understood, this will, probably, remain a mystery impenetrable to man.

402. In order to form some idea of the expression of the countenance, we are desired to suppose four parallel lines to be drawn across it; one in the direction of the eyebrows, another in that of the eyes, a third in that of the lower part of the nose, and a fourth in that of the mouth. It is not meant that these must be right lines, or parallel in the geometrical sense of the word; they are only supposed to have the same direction nearly, and to extend from the one side of the face to the other. While they remain parallel and with little or no incurvation upwards or downwards, the countenance will indicate tranquillity, that is, a composed state of mind without emotion. If they seem depressed in the middle of the face, and elevated towards the sides of it, the expression will incline to cheerfulness; if raised in the middle and de-

pressed towards the sides, the effect will be contrary, and convey an idea of melancholy, or, at least, of sedateness. I do not say, that this holds invariably; I mean, that it is so for the most part: and every thing must be understood to be thus limited that relates to the present subject.

403. The raising of the line of the mouth at the two extremities is so well known to express cheerfulness, that unskilful painters, in order to give that meaning to their portraits, turn up the corners of the mouth, even when the rest of the countenance betokens composure, as the features of those who sit for their picture, commonly do. But this contrivance produces a smirk, or affected grin, rather than a smile, because the rest of the face is not conformable to it. When the lines above mentioned, especially that of the eyebrows (the most expressive of them all) are twisted, or irregularly bent, it generally intimates discomposure of mind, and, when much twisted, violent discomposure. There is expression too, as every body knows, in the colour of certain features. A bright and sparkling eye, and increased ruddiness in the cheeks and lips, accompany keen emotions, as languid eyes and pale lips and cheeks betoken the contrary.

404. Admiration, as formerly observed, ele-

vates the eyebrows, opens the mouth and eyes, fixes the attention upon the admired object, raises the hands, and spreads the fingers: astonishment opens the mouth and eyes still wider, and gives a greater and more irregular elevation to the brows. If to astonishment fear be added, both rows of the teeth will appear, and those ends of the eyebrows which are next the nose will be much wrinkled, and drawn downward so as to hide the upper eyelid. Esteem composes the countenance, elevates the pupils of the eyes, draws the eyebrows down towards the nose, contracts the nostrils, opens the mouth a little, and gently depresses the corners of it. Veneration sometimes assumes the same appearances a little heightened, elevating the pupil of the eye till it almost disappear under the eyelid; and sometimes shuts the mouth and eyes, inclining the face towards the ground, and spreading the hand upon the breast.

405. Contempt elevates and draws back the head, wrinkles and pulls down the brows, distends and raises the nostrils, shuts the mouth and depresses the corners of it, makes the under lip more prominent than the upper, turns away the face from the despised object, and directs the eyes towards it obliquely. Grief raises the brows towards the middle of the fore-

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